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REFRAMING SIMILARITY ANALYSIS IN 
COPYRIGHT 
KEVIN J. HICKEY
 
ABSTRACT 
Copyright law lacks a coherent method to determine non-literal 
infringement. The core inquiry, “substantial similarity,” purports to 
assess whether two works are so alike that an accused work infringes the 
original. Substantial similarity is a fundamental limit on the scope of 
copyright, but it is plagued by confusion and governed by a series of 
arcane tests that differ in each circuit. Even more troubling, courts lack a 
consistent method to go about comparing two works and how the 
comparison between two works is framed. There is no consensus, for 
example, on whether the original work or the accused work should be used 
as the baseline when assessing similarity. Courts sometimes adopt the 
perspective of the original creator, and sometimes of the alleged infringer, 
in determining whether seemingly copyrightable expression has become 
an uncopyrightable idea or functional standard. Courts are even confused 
as to whether dissimilarities or new material added by the defendant have 
any relevance to the comparison. 
This Article seeks to bring analytical clarity to copyright’s similarity 
analysis, with a focus on these often-implicit framing issues. It argues that 
how courts frame the comparison, more than the legal test applied, is 
strongly associated with case outcomes. It urges courts to take a 
consistent approach to framing issues in similarity analysis so as not to 
improperly bias the comparison in favor of either party. In particular, 
courts should adopt a flexible, contextual approach to framing. This 
method considers both the perspective of the original creator and of the 
alleged infringer, as relevant, in drawing the line between permissible and 
substantial copying. It rejects the rigid approach that predominates in the 
case law, and endeavors to consider all relevant information about what 
was copied, how it was used in context, and why. The result is a similarity 
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analysis that is not only more consistent, but a robust and vital limitation 
on the scope of copyright. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not too much to ask that copyright law have a coherent approach to 
copyright infringement. But substantial similarity, copyright law’s core 
infringement inquiry, is a mess. Once the law allows that non-exact copies 
are actionable, courts need some method to determine when two works are 
so alike that one should be deemed an actionable infringement of the 
other. To use a classic example, would West Side Story infringe Romeo & 
Juliet were the latter still under copyright? Or, to take a contemporary 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/6
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dispute, is Robin Thicke’s hit “Blurred Lines” too similar to Marvin 
Gaye’s classic “Got to Give It Up”?1 This question, which copyright calls 
“substantial similarity,” is a famously elusive problem.2 Though 
substantial similarity is acknowledged to be a fundamental limit on the 
scope of copyright, equal in importance to fair use, courts’ attempt to craft 
a predictable, consistent similarity doctrine is widely considered an utter 
failure.
3
  
The most obvious aspect of this failure is the long-standing circuit split 
over the appropriate legal standard for substantial similarity. At least a half 
dozen tests for similarity proliferate in the courts, depending on the 
jurisdiction.
4
 To make matters worse, these tests are unduly complex, even 
by the arcane standards of copyright law.
5
 For example, the dominant 
formulation in the Second Circuit looks to whether an “ordinary 
observer”—sometimes a “more discerning” observer—would regard the 
aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same.
6
 The Ninth Circuit has 
bifurcated similarity analysis into “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” steps, with 
the judge first dissecting and objectively comparing the work’s elements, 
followed by a subjective comparison of similarity by the jury.
7
 Still 
 
 
 1. See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015); Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, ‘Blurred Lines’ Infringed on Marvin 
Gaye Copyright, Jury Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/ 
business/media/blurred-lines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules.html.  
 2. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 48 (Columbia Univ. Press 
eds., 1967) (“We are in a viscid quandary once we admit that [copyrightable] ‘expression’ can consist 
of anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its sequential order.”); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 268 (2014) (“In practice, though, the 
complexities of the fair use doctrine pale in comparison to what is central to almost all cases of 
copyright infringement: the question of ‘substantial similarity.’”); Katherine Lippman, The Beginning 
of the End: Preliminary Results of an Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions in 
the U.S. Circuit Courts, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 515 (alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT C. 
OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW xxi (2012)) 
(“[T]he concept of substantial similarity—a ‘sine qua non of every [copyright infringement] 
determination’—remains one of the most elusive in copyright law.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (characterizing the predominant similarity tests as 
“bizarre” and “mak[ing] no sense”); Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral 
Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1821 (2013) (describing the “case law to be 
frustratingly obscure, ambiguous, and confusing”). 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:94 (2016) (criticizing the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test as “the most complicated copyright ‘test’ ever conceived”). 
 6. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 7. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded on other 
grounds by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized in Segal v. Rogue Pictures, 544 F. App’x 769 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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another strain of jurisprudence declines to compare the individual 
elements of the two works at all, looking instead to similarity in the “total 
concept and feel” of the works.8 A final approach is the specialized 
“abstraction, filtration, comparison” test, usually (but not always) applied 
to computer software, which first lays out the various levels of abstraction 
in the work, then filters out unprotected ideas and functional elements, and 
finally compares the remainder of the two works.
9
  
The issue of which of these tests is best has received a fair bit of 
attention. Much commentary on substantial similarity defends one of the 
existing tests as superior or proposes to replace the confused doctrine with 
a new standard.
10
 Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that this 
long-running debate may be beside the point as a practical matter: in terms 
of case outcomes, the particular test that a court uses does not appear to 
make much difference.
11
 Instead, it may be that factfinders reach an 
intuitive conclusion about similarity when comparing the two works, and 
only then use the various legal formulations to provide an ex post rationale 
for their decisions.
12
 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 
886 F.2d 931, 939 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 9. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 10. See, e.g., Jeannette Rene Busek, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for a New Standard for 
Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1777, 
1795–1803 (1998) (proposing substantial similarity test tailored to the work’s medium); Laura G. 
Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 
181, 194–206 (1993) (proposing harm-based approach to substantial similarity); Lawrence Jeffrey 
Sher, Comment, The Search for a Suitable Standard of Substantial Similarity: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Application of the Krofft Test, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229, 254–62 (1991) (defending variation on the 
Krofft test); Carl A. Sundholm, Essay, High Technology Jurisprudence: In Defense of “Look and 
Feel” Approaches to Copyright Protection, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 209, 217–
25 (1992) (defending the holistic “look and feel” approach); Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity 
and Architectural Works: Filtering Out “Total Concept and Feel,” 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1878–83 
(2007) (arguing for wider use of the abstraction, filtration, and comparison test). 
 11. See Lippman, supra note 2, at 545 (“Remarkably, however, when collapsing the six 
substantial similarity tests into the three main tests—the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test—their substantial similarity win rates become 
closely aligned.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 
473–75, 522 (2015) (noting a “great divergence in outcomes and reasoning . . . in infringement 
analysis” and criticizing judges’ “intuitive” approach); B. MacPaul Stanfield, Note, Finding the Fact 
of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. 
REV. 489, 512 (2001) (“Perhaps the [substantial similarity tests] are not a means to determine 
similarity, but rather a means to explain a finding of similarity that is determined in such a way that 
defies clear explanation.”). There is evidence of an analogous phenomenon in the “likelihood of 
confusion” test in trademark law, where a few factors seem to drive the decision, and judges use the 
other factors to merely justify the outcome. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1598–1622 (2006) (describing trademark 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/6
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Judicial confusion about substantial similarity has another, deeper 
dimension, however—one that has largely escaped notice. This concerns 
not the ultimate legal threshold for similarity, but instead how the 
comparison of the original work and the accused work is framed—that is, 
how courts go about comparing the two artistic works at issue. For 
example, when looking for similarities, should the factfinder assume the 
perspective of the original creator or of the alleged infringer? Results from 
the cognitive sciences have shown that such framing effects can influence 
whether or not people perceive two things as similar.
13
 These framing 
issues, then, may be more important to case outcomes than the much-
debated legal tests. This Article seeks to turn attention to the often implicit 
aspects of how courts approach similarity analysis. Courts have not taken a 
consistent approach to these issues, to put it mildly. 
Consider as an initial example what we will call similarity’s timing 
problem. Much of similarity analysis depends upon distinguishing 
between the elements of a copyrighted work that are protectable 
“expression,” as opposed to uncopyrightable “ideas.”14 In a work of 
nonfiction, for example, the expression would tend to include things like 
particular word choices and phrasing, while the broader thesis and claims 
would be uncopyrightable ideas. Simply put, a later creator is free to 
advance the same argument in a new work, so long as she expresses the 
point in a different way. Ideas, however, are not static concepts. For 
example, the QWERTY keyboard might have been an original 
arrangement of letters when it was created, but it is now surely a 
functional standard idea that cannot be copyrighted.
15
 This raises the 
question: at what point in time should similarity be assessed? Should we 
apply the idea-expression distinction at the time of an original work’s 
creation, or at the time of alleged copyright infringement? Courts have not 
settled on an answer.
16
 
 
 
“decision making in which certain factors drive the outcome and the rest of the factors subsequently 
fall in line to support that outcome”). 
 13. See generally Kate Klonick, Comparing Apples to Applejacks: Cognitive Science Concepts of 
Similarity Judgment and Derivative Works, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 383 (2013) (“Framing 
can result in asymmetrical similarity judgments depending on what is being considered as the referent 
and what is being considered as the subject.”); Amos Tversky, Features of Similarity, 84 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 327, 340 (1977) (“Like other judgments, similarity depends on context and frame of reference.”). 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014). In addition to “ideas,” the statute also prohibits copyright 
protection for a “procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 
Id. 
 15. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., 
concurring) (discussing the QWERTY keyboard example and noting that copyright protection in that 
case would “present the concern with fencing off access to the commons in an acute form”). 
 16. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 557 (6th Cir. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
686 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:681 
 
 
 
 
Similarity’s baseline problem is another divide relating to how the 
infringement analysis is framed.
17
 All courts agree that copying must be 
“substantial” to be actionable, but substantial relative to what? Naively, 
one might presume to look at the amount of the original work that was 
appropriated, or to the amount of the allegedly infringing work that was 
copied. But these measures are not the same if the original work is larger 
than the accused work, or vice versa. Is copying a page from an 
encyclopedia less wrongful than copying the same quantity of expression 
from a novel? Does it matter whether the infringer incorporated that page 
into a larger work? In practice, courts sometimes reject using the 
defendants’ work as the baseline, for fear that a plagiarist could “excuse 
the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”18 But the 
alternative of using the plaintiff’s work as the measure is no more 
equitable.
19
 In effect, that baseline penalizes the original author for 
creating more expression, which seems perverse if copyright is intended to 
incentivize the creation of new works.
20
 Regardless of which baseline is 
best, it might be hoped that courts would at least be consistent, but they 
have reached no consensus.
21
 Even the Supreme Court, addressing the 
issue in the related context of fair use, switched between various baselines 
in its opinion without acknowledging the inconsistency.
22
  
A third framing aspect of substantial similarity—the dissimilarity 
problem—relates to the weight, if any, that dissimilarities between the two 
works should have in the analysis. In other words, if two works share a 
substantial number of similarities, should the fact that they differ in other 
 
 
2004) (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing split in authority as to whether 
idea-expression merger is assessed at copyrightability stage or infringement stage); infra Part II.A. 
 17.  See infra Part II.B. 
 18. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 19. Contra 3 PATRY, supra note 5, § 9:65 (collecting cases and asserting that “the only relevant 
inquiry is whether what was copied from the plaintiff is a material part of the plaintiff’s work”). 
 20. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable 
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”). 
 21. Compare Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 
1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is the relative portion of the copyrighted work—not the relative portion of 
the infringing work—that is the relevant comparison.”), with Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 
(9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (“[I]nsignificant infringement may be substantial only if the material 
is qualitatively important to either [the accused or the original] work.”). 
 22. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66 (using multiple baselines in noting that amount 
copied was a quantitatively “insubstantial” part of the original work but also “13% of the infringing 
article”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/6
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ways matter?
23
 At least one leading commentator thinks not, stating 
categorically, “[i]t is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a 
substantial element of plaintiff’s work can be shown.”24 The case law, 
however, routinely considers “points of dissimilarity” as relevant and 
tending to undermine a finding of similarity
25—though not always.26 
Again, courts show distressing inconsistency on a seemingly fundamental 
aspect of how to go about comparing two works. 
This Article attempts to bring some analytical clarity to substantial 
similarity doctrine, with a particular focus on the framing problems that 
have largely avoided scholarly attention. Its principal aim is to examine 
the overlooked and often-implicit ways that courts frame their 
comparisons, and to call for a consistent approach to these conceptual 
problems in similarity analysis. Detailed examination of several examples 
suggests that these aspects of substantial similarity may be more important 
to the outcome than the particular legal test that is used.
27
 After analyzing 
the widespread inconsistency of the courts on these issues, the Article 
offers some proposed resolutions based on copyright’s core objective to 
“promote the Progress of Science.”28 Whether or not the reader ultimately 
agrees with those resolutions is not the primary point, though of course I 
do hope to persuade. More important, in my view, is for courts to become 
aware of the implicit biases that framing can create in decision-making, 
and to adopt a consistent, principled approach to framing in similarity 
 
 
 23. Clearly, the addition of new material has relevance for the fair use inquiry. See Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (considering whether the accused work “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message” under the first fair use factor). Whether new or transformative material is also 
relevant to the question of substantial similarity, however, is an independent and unresolved issue. See 
infra Part II.C. 
 24. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][1][a] (David Nimmer rev. ed., 
2014). 
 25. See, e.g., Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(citations omitted) (“[D]issimilarity can be important in determining whether there is substantial 
similarity. . . . [N]umerous differences tend to undercut substantial similarity.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Attia v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Novelty 
Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977)) (“[T]he key [to 
substantial similarity is] the similarities rather than the differences.”); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic 
Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988) (“At times, the existence of only minor 
differences may itself suggest copying, indicating that the infringer attempted to avoid liability by 
contributing only trivial variations.”). 
 27. See infra Part II; cf. Lippman, supra note 2, at 545–46 (finding that as to the three main 
substantial similarity tests, “the probability that the copyright holder will prevail remains the same” 
regardless of which test is used).  
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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analysis. The current confusion frees courts to frame the comparison in 
whatever way best justifies a desired outcome. The resulting 
unpredictability ill serves courts, litigants, and—critically—primary actors 
attempting to conform their behavior to the law.  
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I will review 
the confused state of substantial similarity doctrine, including both the 
various tests and elements, like the idea-expression distinction, that are 
common across all jurisdictions. Part II will discuss the divisions in how 
courts frame the comparison between two works, presenting several case 
law examples that illustrate the confusion surrounding these aspects of 
similarity analysis. Finally, Part III will analyze the conflicts over framing 
in substantial similarity and offer resolutions that will serve to promote 
judicial consistency, predictability, and copyright’s ultimate goal of 
encouraging the creation and dissemination of knowledge. 
I. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY BASICS 
This Part will provide a brief overview of the current state of 
substantial similarity doctrine. The first Part lays out the elements of 
copyright infringement in order to understand how substantial similarity 
fits into a typical case. The next Part briefly reviews the various legal 
standards for substantial similarity as they have developed in different 
circuit courts of appeals. The third Part turns to those elements of 
similarity analysis that are common across all jurisdictions, regardless of 
the particular test used. The final Part steps back to ask whether these 
varied and confusing standards have as much practical import as is 
sometimes claimed. 
Two themes emerge from this sketch of the state of substantial 
similarity. The first is the unusual diversity of tests. Unlike the typical 
“circuit split,” the courts are not simply lined up into two opposing camps; 
there are six or more competing formulations, depending on the 
classification scheme.
29
 Moreover, even within a single circuit, courts 
sometimes vary the test used depending on the type of work at issue (e.g., 
 
 
 29. See generally ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 3 (2015) (reviewing each circuit’s tests for substantial similarity, including the 
ordinary observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, abstraction/filtration/comparison, and intended audience tests) 
[hereinafter OSTERBERG]; Lippman, supra note 2, at 546 (comparing success rate of six different tests 
for substantial similarity); Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1823–37 (reviewing five conventional 
substantial similarity tests including the ordinary observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, abstractions, 
abstraction/filtration/comparison, and total concept and feel tests). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/6
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software vs. visual art).
30
 The second theme is the roundabout ways in 
which these diverse tests, although formulated differently, tend to 
converge upon similar concepts.
31
 
A. Elements of Copyright Infringement 
At the broadest level, a successful plaintiff in a copyright infringement 
suit must prove just two things: (1) ownership of a valid copyright in a 
work, and (2) improper copying of original expression by the defendant.
32
 
The second element can be further broken down into two aspects. The first 
(2a) is actual copying: proof that the defendant, as a matter of fact, copied 
from the plaintiff’s work as opposed to creating her work independently.33 
The second (2b) is that the copying of protected material was substantial 
enough to amount to an “improper appropriation.”34 
It is critical to distinguish the role that similarity sometimes plays in 
proof of actual copying (element 2a) from the role that similarity plays in 
determining whether the copying was improper (element 2b). The former 
is sometimes called “probative similarity,” and it relates only to the factual 
issue of proving that the defendant did not create her work on her own, but 
instead copied from the plaintiff’s work.35 Actual copying can be proven 
either directly (such as by admission of the defendant) or, more 
commonly, indirectly.
36
 Indirect proof of copying usually consists of 
proving that the defendant had access to the original work, and that the 
similarities between the original and the accused work are suspicious 
enough to conclude that the defendant copied.
37
 Similarity between the 
two works can thus be relevant to the question of actual copying, but it is 
not what is meant by the term “substantial similarity.”38 
 
 
 30. To take a common example, most circuits use the abstraction/filtration/comparison test in 
computer software cases, regardless of the test used for other literary works. See Samuelson, supra 
note 3, at 1837–40 (describing the abstraction/filtration/comparison test as “[t]he most widely used test 
for judging nonliteral infringement of computer programs”). 
 31. See infra Part I.C. 
 32. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Arnstein v. Porter, 
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 33. Proof of actual copying is necessary as independent creation negates a claim of copyright 
infringement. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 34. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 35. See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204 (1990) (distinguishing between substantial 
similarity and probative similarity)). 
 36. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Regrettably, even sophisticated courts sometimes confuse probative similarity with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Substantial similarity refers instead to the knottier question of when 
copying becomes so extensive that it should be legally actionable. Not all 
copying is copyright infringement. For example, copying might be 
permissible because what was copied was unoriginal, in the public 
domain, unprotected by copyright, or de minimis.
39
 Substantial similarity, 
then, is used as a term of art to represent when copying of protected 
material is quantitatively and qualitatively significant enough to be an 
infringement of copyright.
40
 To say that two works are substantially 
similar is just another way of saying that they are so alike in protected 
elements that one work infringes upon the other. It is the conclusion that 
the defendant’s appropriation was improper. As the next Part reveals, 
courts have created an obscure array of legal tests in their attempt to draw 
this line. 
B. Questionable Standards: The Various “Tests” for Substantial 
Similarity 
This Part reviews the leading formulations for substantial similarity, 
and the difficulties with each approach. These tests are not the primary 
focus of this Article, and—as I argue below—they may have received an 
undue amount of attention in the existing commentary on substantial 
similarity. However, an understanding of the ultimate legal standards for 
substantial similarity is essential to appreciate the importance of the 
framing problems that are discussed in the next Part. 
1. The Ordinary Observer Test  
One of the earliest tests for substantial similarity—and still the most 
widely used—is the Second Circuit’s “ordinary observer” test. The reason 
for the test’s longevity may be its simplicity. It just asks whether a typical 
 
 
substantial similarity. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 720–21 (criticizing judicial decisions for 
making this mistake). 
 39. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“[O]nce 
the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 102) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas. . . . The copyright is limited to 
those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s originality.”); 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven where the fact of copying is 
conceded, no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.”). 
 40. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
203, 205, 208 (2012) (characterizing substantial similarity as a “subjective evaluation of the different 
parts of the two works and of their relative contributions to the overall significance of the work, both 
as a quantitative and qualitative matter”). 
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lay observer would recognize the accused work as having been copied 
from the original.
41
 In other words, would a reasonable viewer, “unless he 
set out to detect the disparities [between the two works], . . . be disposed to 
overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same”?42 The 
ordinary observer test derives from the influential case Arnstein v. Porter, 
in which the renowned composer Cole Porter was accused of plagiarizing 
the comparatively unknown works of Ira Arnstein.
43
 The legal issue in 
Arnstein was whether the similarity analysis should be informed by 
“dissection” of the work (e.g., analysis of the score) and expert testimony, 
or just the music’s effect on a “lay listener.”44 The court held that the latter 
was the key for substantial similarity, but that expert testimony was 
permitted to prove probative similarity.
45
 Variations of the ordinary 
observer test are followed in the First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
46
 
The most obvious difficulty with the ordinary observer test is that, by 
itself, it provides “scant guidance” in similarity analysis.47 While it 
specifies the audience that is to assess similarity, it does not specify what 
the lay observer should be looking for. Moreover, the ordinary observer 
test fails to account for the possibility that the perceived similarity 
between the two works arises primarily from uncopyrightable elements. 
Perhaps as a result, the Second Circuit has created a “more discerning 
observer” test that applies when the work at issue contains significant 
unprotected elements, such as material taken from the public domain.
48
 A 
final shortcoming of the test is that, with regard to dissection and expert 
testimony, Arnstein gets the matter “exactly backwards.”49 For probative 
similarity, dissection of the work is not necessary—copying of 
unprotectable elements is relevant to prove that the accused work was not 
independently created. But the legal conclusion of substantial similarity—
that what was copied was original and significant enough to infringe—is 
precisely the type of issue where a factfinder may need guidance from 
expert musicologists, computer scientists, and the like.
50
 
 
 
 41. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 42. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. 
Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 43. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 44. Id. at 468–69. 
 45. Id. at 473. 
 46. See OSTERBERG, supra note 29, §§ 3:1.2–.5; Lippman, supra note 2, at 526–27. 
 47. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1825. 
 48. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 49. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 736–38. 
 50. See id.; Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1840–42. 
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2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
The extrinsic/intrinsic test was created by the Ninth Circuit in the 
1970s and later adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.
51
 The leading 
case is Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., which involved whether the familiar McDonaldland characters 
(Ronald McDonald, Grimace, the Hamburglar et al.) infringed the 
characters of an earlier children’s television program, H. R. Pufnstuf.52 In 
the course of affirming the judgment against McDonald’s, the Ninth 
Circuit crafted a two-step test for substantial similarity. The first 
“extrinsic” step asks whether there is similarity in the ideas of the two 
works, focusing on objective criteria such as “the type of artwork 
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting”; at this 
stage, dissection of the work and expert testimony are permitted.
53
 The 
second “intrinsic” step asks whether there is similarity in the expression of 
the works, focusing on the subjective response of the factfinder.
54
 Some 
circuits refine this second step further by assuming the perspective of the 
“intended audience” of the work, as opposed to the general public.55 
Like the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test suffers from 
several shortcomings. First, the extrinsic step’s focus on similarity in ideas 
is completely wrongheaded, because copyright does not protect ideas.
56
 
Thankfully, the Ninth Circuit eventually abandoned this formulation, 
explaining that the extrinsic and intrinsic steps both analyze similarity in 
protected expression: it is simply that the former focuses on objective 
criteria, whereas the intrinsic step embraces a more subjective, 
impressionistic approach.
57
 The extrinsic/intrinsic terminology is also 
needlessly complicated.
58
 While “objective/subjective” might better 
 
 
 51. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163–
64 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded on other grounds by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized in Segal 
v. Rogue Pictures, 544 F. App’x 769 (9th Cir. 2013); OSTERBERG, supra note 29, §§ 3:2.1–.3; 
Lippman, supra note 2, at 529–30. 
 52. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1161–62. 
 53. Id. at 1164. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–36 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”). 
 57. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 58. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13:03[E][3][b] (describing the extrinsic/intrinsic test as a 
“metaphysical palace[]”); 3 PATRY, supra note 5, § 9:235 (describing the extrinsic/intrinsic 
terminology as “infinitely . . . complicated” and “meaningless”); Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1829 
(describing the extrinsic/intrinsic terminology as “inapt and confusing”). 
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capture the distinction between the two steps, the old terms persist 
nonetheless.
59
 
 3.  “Total Concept and Feel” 
The “total concept and feel” approach to similarity originated with 
another influential Ninth Circuit case, Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card 
Co.
60
 In Roth, the defendant copied short phrases from Roth’s greeting 
cards, such as “I miss you already” (on the front of the card), and “You 
Haven’t even Left” (on the inside of the card).61 The defendant created its 
own drawings to accompany those simple messages, however. The district 
court in Roth found no infringement because the copied language was 
uncopyrightable (it was too short to be original), and the images on the 
cards were not similar.
62
 The Ninth Circuit reversed; it agreed that the 
language was not protectable, and that the images were different.
63
 
Nonetheless, it found sufficient similarity in the “total concept and feel” of 
the cards, such as “the combination of art work conveying a particular 
mood with a particular message.”64 Judge Kilkenny, in a strong dissent, 
was perplexed at how the whole of the work—the “total feel” of the 
card—could be any “greater than the sum total of its parts”: the words plus 
the images.
65
 
From these humble beginnings, “total concept and feel” rose to become 
a common intonation in substantial similarity cases, either as a part of the 
other tests or as its own stand-alone test.
66
 The phrase and its cousin, 
“overall look and feel,” are invoked on occasion by all the circuits and 
across a wide variety of subject matter.
67
 The test’s ubiquity belies its 
glaring conceptual problems. Like the extrinsic step, “total concept and 
feel” wrongly assesses similarity in elements—“concepts”—that are not 
 
 
 59. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (“[T]he two tests are more sensibly described as objective and 
subjective analyses of expression . . . .”). 
 60. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970), superseded on other grounds by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), 
as recognized in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 61. Id. at 1110. 
 62. Id. at 1109. 
 63. See id. at 1109–10. 
 64. Id. at 1110. 
 65. Id. at 1111–12 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). 
 66. See, e.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 
886 F.2d 931, 939 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 67. See generally OSTERBERG, supra note 29, § 2:5.2 (collecting cases); Samuelson, supra note 
3, at 1830–31 nn. 49–50 (same); NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13:03[A][1][c] (same). 
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protected by copyright.
68
 Just as fundamentally, the test threatens an 
unduly broad notion of infringement, permitting a finding of substantial 
similarity even when the plaintiff cannot articulate any specific elements 
that were copied.
69
 
4. The Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison Test 
The abstraction/filtration/comparison test (the “A/F/C test”) arose out 
of the difficulties of assessing similarity in computer software cases.
70
 At 
its core, the A/F/C test is simply a formalized system to ensure that 
elements that are not protected by copyright are excluded when comparing 
two works. First, the abstraction step examines the plaintiff’s work to 
separate the general ideas—elements that are unoriginal, too general to be 
protected, dictated by functional concerns, and the like—from protectable, 
original expression.
71
 The second step filters out these unprotected 
elements. In the final step, only the protected expression of the two works 
is compared.
72
 Most circuits apply the A/F/C test in computer software 
cases, regardless of the test that they apply to other works.
73
 In the Tenth 
Circuit, however, the A/F/C test is applied to all copyrighted works, and 
the Sixth Circuit likewise applies its variant of the A/F/C test across the 
board.
74
 
There is much to admire about the A/F/C test, particularly in its 
emphasis on distinguishing between protectable and unprotectable 
elements, and excluding the latter from similarity analysis. But the A/F/C 
test has also received its fair share of criticism. Former Professor Patry is 
perhaps the harshest critic, calling A/F/C “the most complicated copyright 
‘test’ ever conceived” that misses important holistic elements of artistic 
works by the “brutal . . . desiccation” of element-by-element analysis.75 
Others argue that, whatever usefulness the A/F/C test may have in the 
 
 
 68. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13:03[A][1][c] (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (“More 
broadly, the touchstone of ‘total concept and feel’ threatens to subvert the very essence of copyright 
. . . . ‘Concepts’ are statutorily ineligible for copyright protection . . . .”). 
 69. See Su, supra note 10, at 1871–72 (noting that “works may appear substantially similar in 
their ‘total concept and feel’ even though the similarities arise from the common use of unprotectable 
elements, such as abstract ideas or public domain material,” and collecting examples in the 
architectural context). 
 70. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 71. See, e.g., Country Kids ’N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
 72. Id. at 1285. 
 73. See OSTERBERG, supra note 29, § 3; NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13:03[F] nn.283.6–.9. 
 74. See OSTERBERG, supra note 29, § 3; Lippman, supra note 2, at 531–32. 
 75. 3 PATRY, supra note 5, § 9:94; 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:27 (2016). 
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software context, it makes little sense for visual or musical works to be 
dissected in this manner.
76
 
C. Common Ground 
Despite the startling diversity of tests for substantial similarity, there 
may be more common ground between the circuits than is usually 
appreciated. Regardless of the test used, courts apply similar concepts in 
distinguishing between unprotectable and protectable elements. This Part 
reviews those doctrines—most prominently the idea-expression 
distinction—that play a role in similarity analysis in all jurisdictions. 
1. The Idea-Expression Distinction 
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of copyright is the notion that 
only original expression, and not “ideas,” can be the subject of copyright. 
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act states that “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”77 This codifies the holding of Baker v. Selden, an 1879 
Supreme Court case addressing the extent of copyright in a book 
describing a method of accounting.
78
 The Court held that the copyright 
extended only to the explanation in the book, and not to the method 
described therein: Selden could prevent others from copying the text of the 
book, but not from using or describing his accounting method.
79
 Copyright 
is intended to promote the creation and dissemination of knowledge, and 
granting a monopoly over something as general as an idea could suppress 
the flow of knowledge.
80
 
While the intuition behind the idea-expression distinction is easy to 
grasp, precisely defining the line between idea and expression is not easy, 
and perhaps not possible.
81
 Nevertheless, the idea-expression distinction 
 
 
 76. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 698 (1999) (“[O]ne cannot divide a visual 
work into neat layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with a text.”). 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014). 
 78. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879). 
 79. Id. at 102–04. 
 80. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (citing Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985)) (“[C]opyright assures authors 
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”). 
 81. The best attempt still belongs to Judge Learned Hand, who wrote when analyzing similarity 
between a play and a motion picture:  
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lurks behind much of substantial similarity analysis, either explicitly or 
implicitly. It is most apparent in the A/F/C test, which is directed primarily 
at extracting unprotectable “ideas” from the similarity analysis. But it is 
present in the observer test as well: the supposedly “ordinary” observer 
tends to become “more discerning” precisely when there are considerable 
unprotectable ideas at issue.
82
 In a similar manner, the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test, as modified, applies only to expression, not ideas.
83
 
2. Merger, Functionality, and Scènes à Faire 
The doctrines of merger and scènes à faire can be viewed as corollaries 
of the idea-expression distinction, and they, too, are commonly invoked in 
similarity analysis regardless of the test being applied. The merger 
doctrine reasons that when there is only a limited number of ways to 
express an idea, permitting copyright on the expression would effectively 
monopolize the idea.
84
 In such a case, the expression is said to merge with 
the idea, and neither is protected by copyright.
85
 In an analogous fashion, 
seemingly expressive elements dictated by functional demands or 
efficiency should be excluded from similarity analysis.
86
 The functional 
end is an idea, and if there are only a few ways to accomplish it, it cannot 
be protected by copyright.  
Erickson v. Blake provides a vivid recent example of the merger 
doctrine.
87
 There, both the plaintiff and the defendant had the idea to 
create a musical work based on the digits of π, wherein each digit 0 to 9 
was assigned to a note and the decimal expansion of π used to create the 
theme of a musical work.
88
 Erickson held that the usually protectable 
 
 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may 
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times 
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are 
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to 
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able 
to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citations omitted). This 
formulation, while helpful, leaves unclear where on this spectrum of abstraction copyright ceases to 
attach. 
 82. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 83. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 84. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606–07 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708–10 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 87. 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Or. 2012). 
 88. Id. at 1134. 
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expression of a melodic sequence had merged with the idea of assigning 
π’s digits to musical notes, and accordingly found no infringement—all of 
the similarities between the two works were traceable to this idea.
89
 
The related but distinct concept of scènes à faire—literally, “scenes 
which ‘must’ be done”—represents a merger-like doctrine in the artistic 
context.
90
 Scènes à faire are “incidents, characters or settings which are as 
a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a 
given topic.”91 For example, a noir detective story set in the gritty South 
Bronx will invariably feature “drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict 
cars.”92 These stock elements and fictional conventions merge with 
general story idea and setting, and are usually—and rightly—excluded 
from the similarity analysis, regardless of the circuit.
93
 Outside of the 
artistic context—particularly in the realm of computer software—courts 
have extended the notion of scènes à faire to include elements dictated by 
external factors such as compatibility, efficiency, or functionality.
94
 
3. Thin and Thick Protection 
Certain types of works are more likely than others to contain 
unprotectable elements such as ideas, unoriginal expression, functional 
elements, stock elements, or elements from the public domain. Courts 
sometimes speak of these works as having “thin” copyrights.95 A thin 
copyright entails a more exacting standard for similarity—it protects 
against only “virtually identical” copying.96 A simple example is a map. 
Because much of a map is dictated by its idea—an accurate representation 
of the territory at issue—maps will typically have a thin copyright vis-à-
vis, say, a painting. It will be of little avail in the similarity analysis to 
observe how both maps depict the same shape of coastline; instead, the 
plaintiff will have to rely on similarity in expressive choices—selection of 
what details to include, color combinations, shading—that are not dictated 
 
 
 89. See id. at 1139–40. 
 90. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945). 
 91. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting 
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
 92. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 93. See 2 PATRY, supra note 75, § 4:24. 
 94. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535–36 (6th 
Cir. 2004). This looser use of scènes à faire has been criticized, with some commentators arguing that 
the doctrine should be limited to the artistic realm. See, e.g., 2 PATRY, supra note 75, § 4:26. 
 95. See Balganesh, supra note 40, at 221–26 (discussing the development of the notion of 
copyright “thickness”). 
 96. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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by the facts represented.
97
 While the thin/thick terminology can be helpful, 
it is really just a kind of shorthand, and it should not be applied 
mindlessly. Some maps—those commonly found on the inside covers of 
fantasy novels, for example—are not based upon reality and are thus 
entitled to a “thicker” copyright. 
D. Do the Tests Matter? 
The circuits’ various tests for similarity offer plenty of technical jargon 
for similarity analysis, but what do they mean for plaintiffs and defendants 
in practice? Are a copyright holder’s chances of success significantly 
better or worse under, say, the ordinary observer test as opposed to the 
abstraction/filtration/comparison test? It is not obvious, a priori, which test 
is more favorable to the copyright holder. On the one hand, it is natural to 
think that tests applying greater dissection (e.g., the A/F/C and more 
discerning observer tests) will tend to find less similarity because they 
make more effort to discount similarities arising from unprotected 
elements. But on the other hand, a close dissection of the works could 
reveal more copying if expert analysis reveals less-obvious similarities 
that an ordinary observer might miss. 
Thankfully, recent empirical research has begun to shed some light on 
these long-debated questions. The surprising takeaway of this research is 
that, for all the attention that the tests have received, they seem to make 
little difference to case outcomes. When parsed at the finest level, the tests 
do appear to matter—plaintiff success rates under the A/F/C test are only 
half those of the more discerning observer test, for example.
98
 But that 
result is hardly surprising. Since many circuits vary the test based on the 
type of work at issue (A/F/C for software, discerning observer for thin 
copyright works),
99
 the comparison is not a fair one. It stands to reason 
that the difference in outcome might be driven by the different type of 
cases that each test assesses—computer software versus fine arts or 
musical works—as opposed to the stringency of the test itself. Indeed, the 
data show huge differences in success rate based on the type of work—
ranging from a plaintiff success rate of 53.6% for graphical works to a low 
of 8.3% for architectural works.
100
  
 
 
 97. See Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 747–49 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
“street locations, landmass, bodies of water and landmarks depicted in a map are physical facts” that 
are unprotected by copyright). 
 98. See Lippman, supra note 2, at 546 fig.5. 
 99. See supra Part I.B. 
 100. Lippman, supra note 2, at 547 fig.6. 
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A better (though still imperfect) comparison looks to the results under 
the three main tests: the observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, and A/F/C tests. This 
comparison ignores the different variants of each test, effectively pooling 
together the more discerning and ordinary observer, for example. It thus 
partially removes the confounding factor that many jurisdictions switch 
between different variants based on the type of work at issue.
101
 Since 
several circuits follow each of these major strands of doctrine—the 
observer test in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits; 
extrinsic/intrinsic test in the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth; the A/F/C test in 
the Sixth and Tenth—there is, hopefully, a fair mix of different types of 
cases analyzed by each test.
102
 When this comparison is made, the plaintiff 
success rates under each of the three main tests are quite similar.
103
 In 
particular, there is no observed statistical difference between the ordinary 
observer and extrinsic/intrinsic tests, and plaintiffs are only a few 
percentage points more likely to succeed under the A/F/C test versus the 
others.
104
 The A/F/C test’s slightly plaintiff-friendly nature may be a result 
of the fact that computer software cases—which tend to have high success 
rates—are usually judged under this rubric.105 
II. FRAMING PROBLEMS IN SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
Having reviewed the confused state of substantial similarity doctrine, 
this Part turns to the primary focus of this Article—the framing problems 
in substantial similarity. It is motivated by the question left lingering by 
 
 
 101. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 102. See supra Part I.B (reviewing the different circuits that follow each test). Another idea would 
be to compare success rates for each circuit, but this runs into the problem of the dissimilar types of 
cases heard in each circuit due to the industries under their jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, is likely to receive a high number of software cases (because of Silicon Valley) as well as 
many cases involving Hollywood firms; the Second Circuit likely hears more cases from the world of 
fine art and publishing. See Lippman, supra note 2, at 525. Thus, we should not be surprised to see 
fairly different success rates across the different circuits, which is in fact what the data reveal. See id. 
at 545 fig.4. 
 103. See Lippman, supra note 2, at 545–46 (“Remarkably, however, when collapsing the six 
substantial similarity tests into the three main tests—the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test—their substantial similarity win rates become 
closely aligned.”). 
 104. See Eric Rogers, Comment, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright 
Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 923–24 
(footnote omitted) (“[A] plaintiff has the same chances of winning if either the ordinary observer or 
the extrinsic/intrinsic test regimes are used. However, a plaintiff is statistically less likely to win if a 
filtration/comparison test is used—5.2% less likely and 3.1% less likely than if the ordinary observer 
or extrinsic/intrinsic tests are used, respectively.”). 
 105. See Lippman, supra note 2, at 547 fig.6.  
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the empirical results reviewed above: if the tests for similarity do not make 
much difference to case outcomes, what does? One possible answer is that 
the similarity “tests” are less a meaningful analytical tool than a way for 
judges to justify their ad hoc, intuitive judgment.
106
 This may be part of the 
story, but in a way it only begs the question as to the factors driving 
similarity analysis. Judges can only indulge in such intuitive decision-
making to the extent that the rules for similarity analysis are 
underspecified.
107
 We might reasonably look, then, to aspects of similarity 
analysis that current doctrine has not settled—those areas in which judges 
are free to choose the rule that best justifies their decision. 
This Part suggests that the ways in which courts frame the comparison 
between the two works exert a powerful effect on substantial similarity 
outcomes. Evidence from the cognitive sciences reveals that framing 
effects can impact perceived similarity. One of the core findings of this 
literature is that the perspective of the comparison is critical: observers are 
found to perceive similarity differently depending on which of the two 
items compared is taken as the subject, and which as the baseline. In 
particular, people perceive greater similarity when the baseline is a more 
prominent concept; they are more likely to agree that “an ellipse is like a 
circle” than “a circle is like an ellipse.”108 As Amos Tversky put it 
succinctly: “[w]e say ‘the son resembles the father’ rather than ‘the father 
resembles the son.’”109 
Issues of perspective and framing are therefore of potentially great 
importance to copyright’s similarity analysis. Using several examples 
from the case law, this Part illustrates how courts can exploit the lack of 
consensus on these issues to frame the inquiry in ways that tilt the 
comparison in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. The first Part examines 
similarity’s timing problem, the question of when the idea-expression 
distinction should apply. The second Part looks at how courts choose the 
appropriate baseline for similarity, using either the original work or the 
accused work (or some other measure) as the benchmark. The final Part 
turns to the question of whether notable dissimilarities are considered in 
the comparison. 
 
 
 106. See Said, supra note 12, at 521–23 (criticizing purely intuitive methods of interpretation in 
copyright as manipulable and lacking transparency); Stanfield, supra note 12, at 492, 512. 
 107. Cf. Said, supra note 12, at 515–23 (arguing that copyright doctrine should do more to restrain 
judges’ discretion in interpretative choices, including infringement analysis). 
 108. Tversky, supra note 13, at 328, 333–34. 
 109. Id. at 328. 
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A few key points emerge from the analysis. The first is framing’s 
relationship with outcomes. How a court chooses to frame the comparison 
is seen to be strongly associated with whether substantial similarity is 
ultimately found. It is important not to infer too much about causality, 
however. It may be that the framing choices bias the judicial comparison 
in favor of or against similarity. Or, perhaps more plausibly, courts might 
select the particular framing that puts their desired outcome in the best 
light. The second observation is that framing problems often relate to the 
question of perspective. Whether we are discussing issues of timing, 
baseline, or dissimilarities, one core issue looms: Should the factfinder 
assume the viewpoint of the alleged infringer, or of the original creator? 
A. The Timing Problem 
This Part examines several instances of similarity’s timing problem. At 
bottom, the timing problem represents confusion about how to apply the 
idea-expression distinction in a dynamic context. Expression that was 
original and protected by copyright when created may subsequently 
become (or merge with) an “idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery” that would not ordinarily be 
protected by copyright.
110
 The question, then, is whether to apply the idea-
expression distinction at the time of the original work’s creation, or at the 
time of the alleged infringement. 
The timing problem represents a particular concern for material that 
becomes a de facto or industry standard after its creation.
111
 For example, 
a model building code is initially a copyrightable literary work, but once a 
jurisdiction adopts it as law, it effectively loses its protection: citizens 
need to be able to state what the law is, and there is no other way to 
express that idea but to quote from the code.
112
 In the context of computer 
software, a split has developed over a related issue: if a piece of code or a 
 
 
 110. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014); see also supra Part I.C.1–2 (discussing the idea-expression 
distinction and the merger doctrine). 
 111. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 
(2007) (presenting examples of this problem and arguing that standards should not be protected by 
copyright); Stephen Preonas, Mergercide, When Good Copyrights Go Bad: A Recommendation for a 
Market-Based, Defendant-Centric Approach to the Merger Doctrine in the Context of Compilations, 
11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 89, 97–109 (2006) (proposing loss of copyright for elements that become 
standards); see also Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application 
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1098–1102 (1989) (arguing for limiting copyright de facto standard 
elements in software, including user interfaces and elements necessary for compatibility); Timothy S. 
Teter, Note, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility Trend in Computer 
Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1066–72 (1993) (same). 
 112. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 801–02 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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user interface becomes so widespread as to become a functional standard, 
should it still be protected by copyright?
113
 Sometimes, courts discuss this 
issue as whether the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire should be 
assessed as part of copyrightability, or as part of the infringement 
inquiry.
114
 Either way, it amounts to the same problem: Should we look to 
the choices presented to the original creator, and protect the material so 
long as it was copyrightable at the time of its creation? Or should we 
instead assume the viewpoint of the defendant, and look to the choices 
available to her when the allegedly infringing work was created? 
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., the most important software 
copyright decision in many years, presents a clear illustration of the 
different perspectives on the timing problem.
115
 Both the district and 
appellate courts in Oracle applied Ninth Circuit precedent, and thus both 
decisions were governed by the same legal framework for substantial 
similarity: the A/F/C test.
116
 However, their distinct approaches to the 
timing problem—particularly, whether one assumes the perspective of the 
original creator or alleged infringer—led the courts to starkly different 
conclusions. 
The dispute in Oracle requires a bit of technical background to 
appreciate. In creating its wildly successful Android operating system for 
mobile phones, Google copied certain aspects of Oracle’s application 
programming interfaces (“APIs”) for the Java computer programming 
language.
117
 APIs are collections of “shortcuts” within Java that 
programmers can call upon to perform common functions, instead of 
writing basic code from scratch.
118
 For example, one API contains a class 
called “math,” within which there is a “max” method that programmers 
 
 
 113. Compare, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that spreadsheet menu hierarchy that became common user standard lacked copyright 
protection as a “method of operation”), aff’d by equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per 
curiam), with Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that 
telecommunications standard command codes contained protectable expression despite being a 
“method of operation”), and Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(rejecting proposition that elements that become an “effective industry standard” lose copyright 
protection). 
 114. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 557–59 (6th Cir. 
2004) (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing split in authority as to whether 
merger and scènes à faire doctrines are assessed at the copyrightability stage or the infringement 
stage).  
 115. 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
 116. Id. at 1357–58. Because this district court viewed the issue as primarily one of 
copyrightability, it did not reach the infringement issue directly, though it discussed and implied the 
principles of the filtration step. See id. 
 117. Id. at 1347. 
 118. Id. at 1348–49. 
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can use to output the greater of two input values.
119
 In building Android, 
Google copied the “declaring code” of 37 out of the 166 API packages in 
Java.
120
 The declaring code is simply the name for the function (in our 
example, “max”) and its definition, as well as its place within the APIs’ 
organization (in our example, within the “math” class).121 Google 
independently wrote implementing code—the operative aspects—for each 
API.
122
  
In short, Google copied the “names” and definitions of thirty-seven 
API packages, as well as aspects of the overall organization of the APIs. 
Google claimed it was entitled to do this in order to allow programmers to 
make functional use of Java in creating apps for Android—and the parties 
acknowledged that the Java language itself was open for all to use.
123
 In 
other words, Google claimed that it copied the APIs not because of their 
elegant expression—that “max” was a particularly apt name—but because 
that terminology had become a standard with which Java programmers 
were familiar. The district court agreed and ruled in favor of Google, 
concluding that the declaring code was not copyrightable, due (in 
significant part) to these interoperability concerns.
124
 The Federal Circuit 
emphatically and unanimously reversed.
125
 
The competing approaches of the district and appeals courts in Oracle 
vividly illustrate the lack of judicial consensus as to when to apply the 
idea-expression distinction, and its stark effect. The district court took the 
view that the line between uncopyrightable idea and protectable 
expression should be determined at the time of infringement, and looked 
to the choices available to Google when it copied the code. It 
acknowledged that there may have been creative choices made in the 
original design of the Java APIs.
126
 But, once designed and widely used, 
anyone who wished to make practical use of the Java language had no 
choice other than to use the names and structure that were standard and 
familiar to programmers.
127
  
 
 
 119. Id. at 1349–50. 
 120. Id. at 1348–49. 
 121. Id. at 1350–51. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle District Court), 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“All agree that Google was and remains free to use the Java language itself.”), rev’d, 750 
F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 124. Id. at 998–1002. 
 125. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1381. 
 126. See Oracle District Court, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 997–98. 
 127. See id. at 1000 (emphasis omitted) (“In order for at least some of this code to run on Android, 
Google was required to provide the same java.package.Class.method() command system using the 
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The Federal Circuit held that this was error. It reasoned that the 
declaring code was protected by copyright because the names involved 
some creative choice at the time of Java’s creation: 
We further find that the district court erred in focusing its merger 
analysis on the options available to Google at the time of copying. It 
is well-established that copyrightability and the scope of protectable 
activity are to be evaluated at the time of creation . . . . The focus is, 
therefore, on the options that were available to Sun/Oracle at the 
time it created the API packages.
128
 
In other words, because the function called “max” could equally have been 
called “greatest” or “most” when it was created, it was original and 
protected by copyright. The fact that “max” subsequently became a 
widespread standard was irrelevant to the infringement analysis.
129
 As 
these subsequent developments were at the core of Google’s justification 
for copying, the Federal Circuit’s approach to the timing problem 
essentially determined the outcome in Oracle. 
 The Sixth Circuit took a quite different approach to similarity’s timing 
problem in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc.
130
 In fact, the Lexmark case is in itself a fascinating study of the issue, 
offering three distinct approaches to the timing issue as embodied in the 
rationales of the district court, the majority appellate opinion by Judge 
Sutton, and the concurrence of Judge Feikens.  
Lexmark is a leading manufacturer of laser and inkjet printers.
131
 Like 
most printer manufacturers, it also sells toner cartridges for its printers; in 
an effort to boost its control over the cartridge market, Lexmark sells what 
it calls “prebate” cartridges.132 In return for a reduced price, the consumer 
agrees not to refill and reuse the toner cartridge via a third party, but 
instead to return the cartridge to Lexmark.
133
 To enforce this, Lexmark 
includes a microchip on its prebate cartridges that uses computer code—
 
 
same names with the same ‘taxonomy’ and with the same functional specifications. Google replicated 
what was necessary to achieve a degree of interoperability—but no more, taking care, as said before, 
to provide its own implementations.”). 
 128. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361 (citation omitted). 
 129. See id. at 1372 (“[T]o the extent Google suggests that it was entitled to copy the Java API 
packages because they had become the effective industry standard, we are unpersuaded. Google cites 
no authority for its suggestion that copyrighted works lose protection when they become popular, and 
we have found none.”). 
 130. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 529.  
 132. Id. at 530.  
 133. Id. 
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Lexmark’s “Toner Loading Program”—to disable the cartridge once it 
runs out of toner.
134
 Static Control Components (“SCC”) engineered a 
microchip that mimics Lexmark’s code to allow consumers to refill and 
reuse their cartridges; in effect, SCC’s chip copies Lexmark’s code in 
order to enable third-party manufacturers to make and sell refurbished 
toner cartridges.
135
 Lexmark was not pleased about this and sued SCC for 
copyright infringement and violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.
136
 
One way to think of Lexmark’s Toner Loading Program (“TLP”) is as 
a kind of “self-creating” standard. Stripped of context, the TLP is just a 
simple piece of code that estimates the toner level.
137
 But once Lexmark 
uses the code in the particular way it did—the TLP is an input in the 
authentication sequence necessary to make the printer function
138—
Lexmark has transformed the TLP into a functional standard or “method 
of operation” outside the scope of copyright.139 The district court viewed 
matters differently, however, and it issued a preliminary injunction against 
SCC.
140
 In essence, the district court took the same approach to the timing 
problem as the Federal Circuit did in Oracle. It assessed the idea-
expression distinction at the time of the TLP’s creation, and simply asked 
whether it was possible to write different code that would perform the 
same function as the TLP.
141
 Finding that a toner loading program might 
be written “in a number of different ways,” the district court ruled that the 
TLP was expression entitled to copyright protection, which SCC duly 
infringed.
142
  
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Lexmark was not likely to 
succeed on its claim of copyright infringement.
143
 Writing for the majority, 
Judge Sutton focused not on infringement, but on originality—whether the 
TLP should have any copyright at all. As to the timing problem, Judge 
Sutton looked at the issue from SCC’s perspective, emphasizing how 
 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 530–31. 
 136. Id. at 531. 
 137. See id. at 529–30. 
 138. See id. at 541. 
 139. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014). 
 140. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. (Lexmark District Court), 253 F. 
Supp. 2d 943, 974 (E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 141. See id. at 950–51 (“The Toner Loading Programs may be expressed in different ways to 
perform the same function, namely estimating the amount of toner . . . . [T]he Toner Loading 
Programs [thus] constitute[] creative expression and [are] entitled to copyright protection.”). 
 142. Id. at 962–65. 
 143. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529. 
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much of the TLP, as used, was dictated by efficiency and functional 
constraints.
144
 Applying the doctrine of merger and scènes à faire in light 
of these constraints, Judge Sutton suggested that the TLP lacked sufficient 
originality to be copyrightable.
145
  
Judge Feikens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, suggested that 
the TLP may be copyrightable, but that SCC did not infringe.
146
 Judge 
Feikens first noted a split in the circuits as to whether the doctrines of 
merger and scènes à faire act as a bar to copyrightability, or instead as a 
part of the substantial similarity inquiry.
147
 The practical difference 
between these two routes is that the former would remove all copyright 
protection for the work, whereas the latter simply states that the work is 
not protected as used in a particular context. Judge Feikens argued that the 
latter was the sounder course, making a helpful analogy: 
[A]n otherwise copyrightable text can be used as a method of 
operation of a computer—for instance, an original, copyrightable 
poem could be used as a password, or a computer program as a 
lock-out code. In my view, therefore, it is necessary to know what 
the potential infringer is doing with the material in order to know if 
merger has occurred. . . . 
Under this reasoning, an individual who copied a poem solely to use 
as a password would not have infringed the copyright, because in 
that scenario, the alleged infringer would have the defense that the 
poem has “merged” with a method of operation (the password). By 
contrast, someone who copied the poem for expressive purposes 
(for instance, as part of a book of poetry) would not have this 
defense.
148
 
Judge Feikens then turned to the infringement analysis. Like Judge Sutton, 
he assessed the idea-expression distinction at the time of infringement, 
looking not to the choices of Lexmark when it wrote the TLP, but those of 
SCC when it copied the TLP. Judge Feikens suggested that, so long as 
 
 
 144. See id. at 537 (holding that the district court erred in “refusing to consider whether ‘external 
factors such as compatibility requirements, industry standards, and efficiency’ circumscribed the 
number of forms that the Toner Loading Program could take”). 
 145. Id. at 541. 
 146. Id. at 558 (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 147. See id. at 557, 559 (explaining and citing cases on both sides of these circuit splits). 
 148. Id. at 557–58. 
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SCC used the TLP in a functional manner—to interface with Lexmark’s 
printers—it would not infringe.149  
The sharp contrast between the approaches in Lexmark and Oracle 
illustrates the unsettled nature of the timing problem and its impact on 
case outcomes. Despite the Federal Circuit’s blithe assertion that the 
timing issue is “well-settled,” actual examination of the case law reveals 
decisions going in both directions.
150
 Especially in the context of software, 
where material can quickly become a widely adopted standard, when a 
court chooses to assess the idea-expression distinction has a huge impact 
on whether similarity is ultimately found.
151
 
B. The Baseline Problem 
This Part explores similarity’s baseline problem: how courts determine 
the benchmark used to measure when similarity becomes “substantial,” 
and therefore an infringement of copyright. In assessing the quantitative 
significance of what the alleged infringer copied, should we look to how 
much was copied from the original work, or how much of the accused 
work is copied material? Or should we instead assess the significance 
against some absolute threshold, or solely as a qualitative matter—the 
economic, artistic, or practical significance of the material copied? In 
contrast to the timing problem, where there are two main camps—
evaluating idea-expression at the time of creation, versus the time of 
infringement—courts take a looser approach to the baseline for 
infringement. To the extent there is any consensus, the traditional rule is 
that the appropriate baseline is the original work.
152
 However, courts’ 
 
 
 149. See id. at 558 (“Defendant can still avoid infringement, however, if it uses the TLP only as a 
method of operation. For instance, Defendant can only claim this defense to infringement if it uses the 
TLP to interface with the Lexmark printers at issue, and if it is a necessary method of operation of the 
machine.”). 
 150. In addition to the contrast between Lexmark and Oracle, compare, e.g., Matthew Bender & 
Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that standard pagination in Westlaw 
case reporters was not protected by copyright), with W. Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 
1219, 1228 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that standard pagination in Westlaw case reporters was protected 
by copyright). For further discussion, see generally Sandro Ocasio, Comment, Pruning Paracopyright 
Protections: Why Courts Should Apply the Merger and Scènes à Faire Doctrines at the 
Copyrightability Stage of the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 303, 
310–23 (reviewing circuit split on the issue of whether merger and scènes à faire are assessed as part 
of copyrightability or infringement). 
 151. See generally Menell, supra note 111, at 1066–67 (arguing that network effects are 
particularly salient in the software context, often leading to standardization); Teter, supra note 111, at 
1066–70 (arguing that standardization can create “lock-in” effects for users and that copyright 
accordingly should not protect elements required for compatibility or de facto standards). 
 152. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
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choice of baseline is often implicit, and courts frequently employ whatever 
baseline provides greater rhetorical support for their argument. 
Although the case arose in the context of fair use, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises provides 
a simple example to illustrate the baseline problem.
153 
Harper & Row 
addressed whether The Nation magazine’s “scoop” of President Ford’s 
unpublished memoir, A Time to Heal, was a fair use.
154
 Having received a 
prepublication copy from an unidentified source, The Nation quoted and 
paraphrased from the forthcoming memoir to produce an article detailing 
Ford’s decision to pardon former President Richard Nixon.155 The 
Nation’s article was 2250 words (about five to ten pages), of which about 
300 were direct quotes from the Ford memoir.
156
 The original work, Ford’s 
memoir, was about 200,000 words.
157
 
The third statutory factor for determining whether a use is fair directs 
courts to consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”158 This suggests that the 
proper baseline in the fair use context is the original work, and the 
majority opinion in Harper & Row pays some lip service to that notion.
159
 
Taken literally, this measure would suggest that what The Nation took was 
quantitatively trivial—300 words out of 200,000, or about 0.1%. Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion concedes that 300 words is an 
“insubstantial” part of Ford’s memoir.160 Rather abruptly, however, the 
majority opinion shifts the baseline and emphasizes that the quotes were 
“at least 13% of [The Nation’s] infringing article”—and, moreover, very 
significant as a qualitative matter: the “heart of the book.”161 Justice 
Brennan’s dissent, in a footnote, gently takes the majority to task for this 
switch.
162
 
 
 
 153. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 154. Id. at 542–43. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 545. 
 157. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2014). 
 159. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (“[T]he Act directs us to examine the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 564–65. 
 162. Id. at 599–600 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Superficially, the Court would thus appear to 
be evaluating The Nation’s quotation of 300 words in relation to the amount and substantiality of 
expression used in relation to the second author’s work as a whole. The statute directs the inquiry into 
‘the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,’ 17 
U.S.C. § 107(3) (emphasis added). As the statutory directive implies, it matters little whether the 
second author’s use is 1- or 100-percent appropriated expression . . . .”). 
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Substantial similarity, even more so than fair use, is a common law 
doctrine, and its baseline is not dictated by any statutory considerations. In 
practice, however, courts tend to follow the course of the Supreme Court 
in Harper & Row. They pay lip service to the notion that the original work 
is the appropriate baseline—if they address the issue at all—but then 
disregard analytical consistency to select whatever baseline strengthens 
their argument. 
Newton v. Diamond provides an atypically thorough examination of the 
baseline problem in the substantial similarity context.
163
 Newton involved 
the Beastie Boys’ song “Pass the Mic,” which prominently featured a 
sample of “Choir” by the jazz flutist James Newton.164 Newton’s 
technique in “Choir” was unusual, with the score instructing the performer 
to “sing[] into” the flute while fingering particular pitches, creating a 
ghostly effect.
165
 The Beastie Boys took a six-second sample from “Choir” 
and looped it, using the sample as a background element for almost all of 
the duration of “Pass the Mic.”166 Newton sued for copyright infringement, 
and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Beastie 
Boys.
167
 
The case is complicated somewhat by the unusual nature of Newton’s 
work, and the fact that the Beastie Boys had a partial license to use it. 
There are two types of copyrights in a musical recording: one for the 
composition, and another for the sound recording itself.
168
 The former 
covers the work of the writer of the music and lyrics, which is sometimes 
embodied in a score; the latter covers the work of the performers and 
producers of a particular recording.
169
 For “Pass the Mic,” the Beastie 
Boys secured permission from the owner of the sound recording copyright 
(which Newton had assigned), but not from the owner of the composition 
copyright, which remained with Newton.
170
 Thus, some of the debate in 
the case focused on delineating which aspects of the sample were 
attributable to Newton’s composition, and which to his performance.171 
 
 
 163. 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 164. Id. at 1191. 
 165. Id. at 1197–99 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. at 1192.  
 167. Id. 
 168. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2014). 
 169. See Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142–43 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (discussing 
distinctions between copyright in musical compositions and sound recordings); see also generally U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56A: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND 
SOUND RECORDINGS 1 (2012), available at http://copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf (same). 
 170. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191. 
 171. Compare id. at 1195 (characterizing the sample as a “three-note sequence”), with id. at 1197–
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Putting that issue aside, the judges in Newton struggled to define the 
baseline against which to measure whether the Beastie Boys’ use of the 
sample was substantial enough to be an infringement.
172
 On the one hand, 
the sample was a limited part of Newton’s work (only a few seconds), but 
on the other, the sample was a significant part of the infringing work (the 
main background element). The majority in Newton cited the traditional 
rule that the plaintiff’s work should be the baseline, and suggested that the 
copying was insubstantial as a result.
173
 It emphasized that the sample 
“appears only once in Newton’s composition,” and that six seconds was 
merely “two percent of the four-and-a-half-minute” running time of 
“Choir.”174 But what of the fact that the Beastie Boys looped the sample, 
such that it constituted a large part of the accused work? Strikingly, 
because of its chosen baseline—and in contrast to the approach in Harper 
& Row—the majority found that the looping was entirely “irrelevant in 
weighing the sample’s qualitative and quantitative significance.”175 
It is worthwhile to trace how Newton reached its conclusion to 
disregard how the defendants actually used the sample when assessing 
similarity. The rationale for assessing infringement against the baseline of 
the original work derives—as does a surprising amount of copyright 
doctrine—from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand. In Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures, Corp., Judge Hand addressed whether a play and a 
movie—both loosely based on the same real-life story of Madeleine 
Smith, a cause célèbre of the day—were similar enough in plot, character, 
and incident such that the movie infringed the earlier play.
176
 Although the 
movie took no dialogue directly from the play, Judge Hand thought the 
characters and certain scenes were so alike that the movie was an 
infringement.
177
 Rejecting out of hand the defendant’s attempt to rely on 
the many differences between the movie and picture, Judge Hand held that 
this was “immaterial” because “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by 
showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”178  
 
 
98 (Graber, J., dissenting) (observing that the sequence is sung above the fingered notes, creating “four 
separate tones,” and that the unusual playing technique was transcribed in the score). The majority 
conceded, for purposes of the appeal, that the “multiphonics” obtained through Newton’s technique 
were part of the composition. Id. at 1191. 
 172. Id. at 1192–96. 
 173. Id. at 1195 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)). 
 174. Id. at 1195–96.  
 175. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). 
 176. 81 F.2d 49, 49–53.  
 177. Id. at 54–55.  
 178. Id. at 56. 
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Judge Hand’s pithy line—which I will call “the Sheldon rule”—has 
become something of a mantra in copyright infringement cases, being 
“wildly over-cited” in subsequent decisions.179 Interestingly, the Sheldon 
rule was originally designed to benefit the copyright holder by ignoring 
any new material that the infringer introduced. The concern motivating 
Judge Hand seems to be that an infringer could escape liability simply by 
“tacking on” a large amount of unrelated new material. The majority in 
Newton, however, used Sheldon in quite the opposite way, for the benefit 
of the defendant. It discounted how the Beastie Boys actually used the 
sample, focusing on the fact that the sample was merely a small part of the 
original work. Dissenting in Newton, Judge Graber felt that the majority 
had unfairly dismissed the qualitative importance of what was copied from 
Newton, noting that much of what made Newton’s work so distinctive was 
the playing technique, a part of the composition and of the sample.
180
 
The recent case of Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc.
181
 suggests that a 
literal application of the Sheldon rule can sometimes produce troubling 
results. Robin Antonick, pursuant to an agreement with Electronic Arts 
(“EA”), designed and wrote source code for 1988’s John Madden 
Football, a video game for the Apple II computer.
182
 That game was the 
first in a phenomenally successful franchise; later games for systems like 
the Sega Genesis, Xbox, and PlayStation have sold over 85 million copies 
and grossed around $4 billion for EA.
183
 Antonick’s contractual agreement 
with EA entitled him to royalties on any “derivative works” using his 
code, and—after discovering similarities between the first game and later 
entries in the Madden series—Antonick sued EA for royalties based on the 
sale of the later games.
184
 EA claimed that the code for the later games was 
developed independently—it had, falsely, told Antonick the same thing for 
years.
185
 The jury, however, found that EA copied Antonick’s code for the 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., 3 PATRY, supra note 5, § 9:65. A Westlaw search for the quote yields ninety-five 
federal cases citing Hand’s statement verbatim. 
 180. See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1197–98 (Graber, J., dissenting). Because she considered the sample 
to be qualitatively significant, Judge Graber declined to assess its quantitative significance. Id. at 1198 
n.3. 
 181. No. C 11-1543 CRB, 2014 WL 245018 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014).  
 182. Id. at *1. 
 183. See, e.g., Joel Rosenblatt, Electronic Arts Must Pay $11 Million After Verdict, BLOOMBERG 
(July 23, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-24/electronic-arts-must-
pay-11-million-after-verdict. 
 184. Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. C 11–01543 CRB, 2011 WL 4501324, at *2–3 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 27, 2011). 
 185. Indeed, the long delay in bringing suit was, according to Antonick, the result of 
misrepresentations by EA that the later versions of Madden Football were developed in a “clean 
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football plays and formations and used this code in the later games; it 
awarded Antonick $11 million in damages.
186
 
EA sought a new trial, arguing that the first Madden game was not 
substantially similar to the later versions as a matter of law—and therefore 
no royalties were owed.
187
 Judge Breyer agreed that the jury was entitled 
to find that EA’s code for the later Madden games governing plays and 
formations was, in fact, copied from Antonick.
188
 But he ruled that this 
copying was not substantial when comparing the original and accused 
games “as a whole.”189 The code that EA had copied from Antonick was 
only one part of a larger video game. The jury was required to find that the 
later versions were similar enough on the level of the entire work—not 
just in the infringing module.
190
 This, Judge Breyer claimed, no reasonable 
jury could find based on the evidence presented.
191
 Confusingly, although 
Judge Breyer cited Newton to say that significance is to be measured 
against the plaintiff’s work, he primarily faulted Antonick for not 
presenting evidence of the whole of EA’s later Madden games (the 
accused works).
192
 
The result in Antonick illustrates some potential problems with a strict 
application of Sheldon’s plaintiff’s-work-as-baseline rule. Why should EA 
be excused from liability just because the code it copied from Antonick 
happened to be incorporated into a large work? Would EA’s copying of 
the plays and formations code be any more or less wrongful if the Madden 
games had been “smaller” works—say, a text-based computer game? If, as 
Sheldon suggests, the fact that the accused work contains extra expression 
should not negate substantial copying, then why should the original work 
not get the same benefit? It seems odd that Antonick should be penalized, 
in effect, for creating a more complex video game.  
 
 
room” without any use of his code. Id. at *1. The jury credited Antonick’s version of events. See 
Antonick, 2014 WL 245018, at *5. 
 186. Rosenblatt, supra note 183. 
 187. Antonick’s contract with EA defined the term “derivative works” to parallel the statutory 
definition in US copyright law; thus, the contractual question is identical to the usual legal one of 
whether the allegedly infringing works were “substantially similar” to the original Apple II game. See 
Antonick, 2014 WL 245018, at *6. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at *7–10. 
 190. Id. at *6–7. 
 191. Id. at *7–10. Antonick has appealed the decision and the case is pending in the Ninth Circuit. 
See Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. C 11-1543 CRB, 2014 WL 245018 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 
2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-15298 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2014). 
 192. See Antonick, 2014 WL 245018, at *7 (“The Jury Had No Evidence of Sega Madden as a 
Whole.”). 
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The Oracle v. Google dispute, discussed above,
193
 illustrates yet 
another approach to substantial similarity’s baseline, and one at odds with 
both Newton and Antonick. In addition to their dispute over the timing 
problem, the district and appellate courts in Oracle also differed on how to 
assess the substantiality of what Google copied. The district court 
followed Sheldon and emphasized that very little code was copied in the 
context of the original work: of 166 Java APIs, 129 were not copied at all, 
and of the 37 at issue, only 3% of the API code (the declaring code) was 
copied.
194
 In fact, 3% was a generous estimate: as both Android and the 
Java platform writ large contain millions of lines of code, the amount 
copied is quantitatively infinitesimal regardless of which work is used as 
the measure.
195
 The Federal Circuit in Oracle, however, did not let that 
stand in its way. Disregarding both baselines, it emphasized the total 
amount copied as an absolute matter, repeatedly referring to the “7,000 
lines of code” that Google copied.196 
In sum, courts have adopted a shifting approach to similarity’s 
baseline—sometimes paying lip service to the Sheldon rule, but deviating 
from it when it is helpful to make a rhetorical point, strengthen an 
argument, or avoid a thorny issue. The result is unpredictability in how to 
assess quantitative significance in copyright infringement. 
C. The Relevance of Dissimilarity 
This Part analyzes several examples of how dissimilarities are 
considered—or not—in substantial similarity analysis. On the surface, the 
doctrine in this area appears to be at odds with itself. Citing the Sheldon 
rule, some courts refuse to consider dissimilarities, lest the defendant 
escape liability “by showing how much of [the] work he did not pirate.”197 
The influential Nimmer copyright treatise takes Sheldon to an extreme, 
asserting that “[i]t is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a 
 
 
 193. See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text. 
 194. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle District Court), 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1001 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“In closing, it is important to step back and take in the breadth of Oracle’s claim. Of the 
166 Java packages, 129 were not violated in any way. Of the 37 accused, 97 percent of the Android 
lines were new from Google and the remaining three percent were freely replicable under the merger 
and names doctrines.”), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 195. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. 750 F.3d 1339, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 196. See id. at 1356, 1359, 1363. 
 197. See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 
(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)). 
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substantial element of plaintiff’s work can be shown.”198 But courts just as 
easily invoke another widely cited maxim: “[n]umerous differences tend to 
undercut substantial similarity.”199 The tension between these two lines of 
jurisprudence creates uncertainty about the significance of dissimilarities 
in infringement analysis. 
A careful treatment of this issue can be found in Warner Bros. v. 
American Broadcasting Companies.
200
 That case presented questions 
about the scope of the copyright in the character of Superman. ABC’s 
television show The Greatest American Hero featured a character, Ralph 
Hinkley, who has a number of superficial features in common with 
Superman.
201
 Hinkley wears a skin-tight leotard with a prominent insignia 
on his chest, and a cape; he has superhuman speed and strength derived 
from an extraterrestrial source; he can fly; he is impervious to bullets; he 
has “holographic” (though not x-ray) vision.202 Moreover, characters on 
the show knowingly reference the Superman franchise. Looking at himself 
in the mirror, Hinkley says, “It’s a bird . . . it’s a plane . . . it’s Ralph 
Hinkley.”203 After watching his unsuccessful attempt at flight, a youngster 
tells Hinkley, “Superman wouldn’t do it that way.”204  
If Nimmer’s view of the Sheldon rule is taken at face value, we might 
think that these many similarities would be the end of the similarity 
analysis. But Judge Newman’s opinion in Warner Bros. found that 
Hinkley’s differences with Superman were important, and undermined the 
similarities. Hinkley is a bumbling, awkward superhero—an inversion of 
the straitlaced, confident Superman. Hinkley lost the instruction manual 
that came with his superpowers; when he tries to fly, he cannot steer and 
crash lands; he is impervious to bullets, but still cowers and covers his 
face when shot at; his suit is red, not blue.
205
 Are we to disregard these 
dissimilarities?  
In Warner Bros., Judge Newman first observed the apparent “paradox” 
between the Sheldon rule and the notion that a defendant may avoid 
infringement by making sufficient changes to her work: 
 
 
 198. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13.03[B][1][a]. 
 199. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Herbert 
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
 200. 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 201. Id. at 236. 
 202. Id. at 236–37. 
 203. Id. at 237. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 236–38. 
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The two propositions are not facially inconsistent; the second 
proposition contemplates a work that would be substantially similar 
if its author had not made changes from the plaintiff's work. Yet in 
practice the distinction between the two propositions has become 
somewhat blurred. We have observed that “numerous differences 
tend to undercut substantial similarity.” . . . 
The tension between these two propositions perhaps results from 
their formulation in the context of literary works and their 
subsequent application to graphic and three-dimensional works. A 
story has a linear dimension: it begins, continues, and ends. If a 
defendant copies substantial portions of a plaintiff’s sequence of 
events, he does not escape infringement by adding original episodes 
somewhere along the line. A graphic or three-dimensional work is 
created to be perceived as an entirety. Significant dissimilarities 
between two works of this sort inevitably lessen the similarity that 
would otherwise exist . . . .
206
 
In other words, the Sheldon rule only makes sense, if at all, when the 
defendant has tacked on additional expression to an already-infringing 
work. It should not be applied blindly to disregard important differences 
between two works, and especially not to “non-linear” works such as 
characters or graphical works. Finding that the striking differences 
between Ralph Hinkley and Superman in personality undercut their 
similarity in superpowers, Judge Newman found no substantial 
similarity.
207
 
Judge Newman is certainly correct that the Sheldon rule can be 
understood narrowly to permit consideration of dissimilarities. But his 
subtle resolution underestimates the lasting power of Learned Hand’s 
dictum, and other courts have not always been so careful. In particular, 
consideration of dissimilarities is often decisive in works with thin 
copyrights.
208
 In such cases, the original and accused works are likely to 
be perceived as similar in the colloquial sense. However, that similarity 
may derive principally from unprotectable elements, such as material 
dictated by functional requirements or taken from the public domain. 
Being able to rely on differences to rebut such perceived similarity thus 
becomes quite important in these cases. 
 
 
 206. Id. at 241 (citations omitted). 
 207. Id. at 243–45. 
 208. See supra Part I.C.3 (explaining notion of thin copyright). 
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Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc. 
provides an example.
209
 Tufenkian was a dispute between two rug 
designers. The plaintiff, James Tufenkian, developed his “Floral Heriz” 
design by combining two rugs in the public domain, the “Battilossi” (a 
Persian antique) and the “Blau” carpet (an Indian Agra).210 The principal 
field of the carpet was taken from the Battilossi; Tufenkian elongated the 
design, selectively culled some motifs from the dense Battilossi pattern, 
and placed it slightly off center to create an asymmetrical effect.
211
 
Tufenkian took the main border from the Blau, and added original minor 
borders.
212
 The defendant’s rug design combined the same two public 
domain sources—Battilossi for the field and Blau for the border. However, 
the accused work used the raw components differently, adding a second 
“beetle” element to the field, employing a symmetrical design, modifying 
the main Blau border in a different way, and making different selections in 
removing motifs from the Battilossi—keeping one the plaintiff did not, 
and removing one that the plaintiff kept.
213
 
The district court found that Tufenkian had a valid copyright in his rug 
design, though it offered only thin protection “due to the very substantial 
incorporation of public domain elements.”214 Accordingly, the judge 
applied the more discerning observer test.
215
 He found that the concept of 
combining the Battilossi and Blau public domain rugs was an “idea,” and 
discounted similarity based on the overall design.
216
 On this view, the 
rug’s protectable elements were limited to the “removal of certain 
elements to create open space, the asymmetrical pattern, the elongation of 
the design adapted from the body of the Battilossi rug, the adaptation of 
the Blau rug border, [and] the creation of the castle and stick figure animal 
borders.”217 These elements, however, were not copied—the defendant’s 
design was symmetrical, it selected different elements to remove, and it 
modified the Blau border in a different way.
218
 Recognizing that “any 
 
 
 209. 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 210. Id. at 129. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 129–30. 
 213. Id. at 130. Pictures of the original and accused rugs, as well as the Battilossi and Blau, can be 
found in the appendices to the district court opinion. See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. 
Einstein Moomjy, Inc. (Tufenkian District Court), 237 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390–393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
vacated, 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 214. Tufenkian District Court, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 384. 
 215. Id. at 386. 
 216. Id. at 388. 
 217. Id. at 387. 
 218. Id. at 388. 
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written description cannot adequately capture the totality of the 
comparison,” the judge noted that, at his request, the parties brought the 
full-sized rugs into court so that he could personally view them.
219
 Based 
on this analysis, he granted summary judgment to the defendants.
220
 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the rugs were substantially 
similar as a matter of law.
221
 The appeals court agreed that the more 
discerning observer test applied, but it gave far more weight to similarity 
in “total concept and feel.”222 Some of the difference between the courts 
lies in the fact that the Second Circuit judged the defendant’s selective 
removal of motifs to be more similar to the plaintiff’s than the district 
court did.
223
 However, the Second Circuit also held that the defendant’s 
addition of a new element—the “beetle” theme—was of no import to the 
analysis. Citing Sheldon, the court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise 
would be rather like holding that one who closely copies a long poem can 
do so without prima facie infringement if she replaces one (admittedly 
significant) stanza with verse of her own invention.”224 Thus, even in the 
Second Circuit—and in a case involving a graphical work—not all courts 
recognize Judge Newman’s admonishment that differences can act to 
undercut similarities. 
Kurt S. Adler, Inc. v. World Bazaars, Inc. is another thin copyright case 
where consideration of differences effectively determines the outcome.
225
 
Adler presented the question of whether two Christmas tree ornaments, 
each depicting a Santa Claus who was equipped to blow soap bubbles, 
were substantially similar.
226
 As the district court recognized, Adler is a 
difficult case because so little of each work is protectable expression. First, 
there was no dispute that “stereotypical elements” of Santa Claus—“a 
jolly, rotund, elder gentleman, wearing a red suit and floppy cap with 
white trim, and a black belt and boots”—are unprotectable.227 Moreover, 
the elements of the work that enabled the Santas to blow bubbles—“a 
 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 389. 
 221. Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 129, 137 
(2d Cir. 2003). This unusual procedural posture is further evidence of the confusion in substantial 
similarity—both the district and appellate court felt certain enough in their assessment to grant 
judgment as a matter of law, but to opposite parties. 
 222. See id. at 133–34; see also supra Part I.B.3 (describing the total concept and feel test). 
 223. Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 135–36. In a footnote, the Second Circuit suggested, but did not 
decide, “that the district court probably erred in categorically dismissing as an unprotected ‘idea’ the 
plaintiff's combination of the Battilossi half-field and Blau-ish border.” Id. at 135 n.11. 
 224. Id. at 137. 
 225. 897 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
 226. Id. at 93–94. 
 227. Id. at 95. 
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pivoting arm holding a bubble wand, which arm is capable of dipping the 
wand into a reservoir of bubble fluid and bringing the wand to a round 
hole in Santa’s mouth”—are functional elements that must also be 
excluded from the similarity analysis.
228
  
Nonetheless, the district court found infringement was likely. The 
judge focused on similarity in “overall appearance,” noting that each Santa 
had “a pear shaped head, a red underlip emphasized, an upcurving 
mustache, a skin tone bubble nose, rounded boots, [and] a similarly shaded 
green basin.”229 However, the two Santas were different in many other 
ways: one’s eyes had “crowfeet”; the beards were different; one had black 
gloves, the other green mittens; and the postures and bases were 
different.
230
 Although the judge in Adler did not adhere to the Sheldon rule 
and completely disregarded these dissimilarities, he gave them very little 
weight. Adler held that the differences were “all but irrelevant to the 
overall appearance” because an ordinary observer would overlook them.231 
Of course, most of the similarity in overall appearance was doubtless due 
to the fact that both toys depicted a stereotypical Santa Claus. 
In sum, courts give varying degrees of weight to dissimilarities in the 
substantial similarity analysis. Strict application of the Sheldon rule 
suggests that they are irrelevant, and courts such as the appeals court in 
Tufenkian take this at face value, ignoring additions and changes in the 
accused work. By contrast, dissimilarities were at the heart of the case in 
Warner Bros., undercutting quite numerous similarities. Finally, courts 
such as the district court in Adler take an intermediate approach, formally 
considering dissimilarities but affording them little weight, even in a case 
involving a thin copyright. 
III. A PROPOSED CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
This Part uses the case law examples discussed above to offer some 
proposed resolutions to the framing problems in similarity analysis. In 
general, I advocate for a more contextual, flexible, and subtle approach to 
these vexing issues than courts have usually taken. Such an approach 
strives to put the defendant’s copying in context, viewed against both the 
original work and the accused work. It considers not only the perspective 
of the original creator, but of the alleged infringer as well. It rejects 
 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 95–96. 
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selecting only the original or accused work as the sole baseline in 
similarity analysis, or disregarding important differences or the addition of 
new material. It endeavors not to dismiss relevant information about what 
was copied, how it was used, and why.  
This proposed approach eschews formalist rules, like the Sheldon rule, 
that result in courts focusing only on the original work as the baseline, and 
stripping the accused work of its context. For example, why ignore 
subsequent events—such as developments that made copyrightable 
expression a functional standard—when those developments were the very 
reason the copying was made? Why disregard how the copied expression 
was used in the context of the defendant’s work when assessing its 
substantiality? The path detailed below seeks to assume the perspectives 
of both the original creator and alleged infringer, as relevant, in attempting 
to draw the elusive line past which copying becomes significant enough to 
be actionable. 
It should be made clear at the outset that nothing in these proposed 
resolutions encroaches upon or diminishes that other critical limitation on 
the scope of copyright, fair use. Fair use is independent of substantial 
similarity, arising only after the plaintiff has proven infringement.
232
 While 
there may be some overlap between the two doctrines—both consider, for 
example, how much expression was copied
233—they remain distinct and 
independent. Fair use considers many factors, such as educational or 
parodic purpose, that even the most broadly conceived similarity analysis 
would not.
234
 The suggested reforms to substantial similarity outlined 
below are thus intended only to complement, not to supersede, fair use. 
Substantial similarity may receive less attention, but it is at least as 
complex as fair use, and of more general application.
235
 A significant 
motivation of this Part is to ensure that substantial similarity, like fair use, 
remains a robust and vital limitation on copyright. 
 
 
 232. See Balganesh, supra note 40, at 206 (citations omitted) (“[Substantial similarity] bears no 
connection whatsoever to the fair-use doctrine, a doctrine which operates as a defense to infringement 
rather than as a component of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”). 
 233. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2014) (“[Fair use considers] the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . . . .”), with Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[Substantial similarity] requires that the copying is 
quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion that infringement (actionable 
copying) has occurred.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–84 (1994) (giving heavy 
weight to a work’s parodic elements under the first fair use factor).  
 235. See Balganesh et al., supra note 2, at 268 (“[T]he complexities of the fair use doctrine pale in 
comparison to what is central to almost all cases of copyright infringement: the question of ‘substantial 
similarity.’”). 
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A. Applying the Idea-Expression Distinction Dynamically 
This Part argues that the idea-expression distinction should be 
evaluated dynamically. In particular, subsequent events that turn once-
protectable elements into unprotectable ideas or functional standards must 
be considered in determining whether copyright infringement has 
occurred. This Part conceives of similarity’s timing problem as two related 
but distinct splits in judicial authority: (1) whether the doctrines of merger 
and scènes à faire are assessed as part of copyrightability or infringement; 
and (2) whether the idea-expression distinction should apply at the time of 
creation or the time of infringement. It argues that the second question is 
the critical issue, and that copyright’s constitutional purpose to promote 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge requires that the idea-
expression distinction apply in a dynamic fashion. In effect, this means 
that material must be protectable by copyright both at the time of creation 
(in order to be original and copyrightable in the first instance) and at the 
time of infringement (in order to avoid idea-expression merger). 
Recall that similarity’s timing problem concerns how to handle 
elements that were once copyrightable expression, but subsequently 
become or merge with an idea that is not protectable by copyright.
236
 
Courts such as the district court in Lexmark focus on the perspective of the 
original creator, and conclude that the work is protectable by copyright if 
it could have been expressed in multiple ways at the time of creation.
237
 
The Federal Circuit in Oracle followed similar logic, focusing on the 
options available at the time of creation, and ignoring the interoperability 
concerns that motivated Google’s copying.238 In contrast, the appeals court 
in Lexmark and the district court in Oracle looked at the choices available 
to the alleged infringer at the time of infringement, ruling for the 
defendants because what was copied had become a functional standard or 
method of operation.
239
 
These varying approaches derive from two distinct splits in authority, 
and much confusion has resulted from courts’ failure to be precise about 
the difference. The first issue—the primary focus of the scholarly 
literature—is whether merger and scènes à faire should be part of the 
 
 
 236. See supra Part II.A (explaining and providing examples of the timing problem). Although the 
discussion here principally uses “idea” as a shorthand for any non-expressive elements, the same 
analysis of course applies to other unprotected categories such as a “procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014). 
 237. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 123–27, 146–49 and accompanying text. 
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copyrightability inquiry or part of the infringement inquiry.
240
 At 
minimum, the initial copyrightability inquiry includes the requirement that 
the plaintiff’s work be original; that is, independently created and 
possessing “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”241 Originality thus 
requires some modicum of artistic choice in creation, and those choices 
must not be commonplace, mundane, or dictated by efficiency or 
functional concerns—or else the work is not copyrightable at all.242 Some 
courts go further to apply the merger doctrine, too, as part of this 
copyrightability analysis.
243
 Other courts view merger as part of the 
substantial similarity/infringement analysis.
244
 
The second split is when to apply the idea-expression distinction. This 
issue becomes critical when an expressive element becomes, with time, an 
idea, system, functional standard, or method of operation. In other words, 
when determining what is an “idea,” should we look to the choices and 
constraints facing the original author at the time of creation, or the alleged 
infringer at the time of infringement? The competing opinions in Oracle 
illustrate this divide. The district court focused on the choices available to 
Google at the time of copying, finding merger because Google copied only 
what was necessary to achieve a degree of interoperability.
245
 The Federal 
Circuit focused instead on the time of creation, concluding that there was 
no merger and dismissing Google’s claim that the API names had become 
“industry standard[s].”246 
While one might presume that these two issues are rigidly linked—that 
if merger is part of copyrightability, one should define the scope of “idea” 
at the time of creation—they are, in practice, independent. Judge Sutton’s 
opinion in Lexmark, for example, takes what we might call a “mixed” 
view. Though the opinion is not perfectly clear on this point, Judge 
Sutton’s holding focuses primarily on the Toner Loading Program’s lack 
 
 
 240. See, e.g., 2 PATRY, supra note 75, § 4:46 (“[M]erger, if applied at all, should be applied at 
the infringement, not at the originality stage of analysis.”); Ocasio, supra note 150, at 310–23 (arguing 
that merger should apply as part of copyrightability); Teter, supra note 111, at 1075–77 (arguing that 
merger should be applied “as a question of substantial similarity rather than as a question of 
copyrightability”). 
 241. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 242. See id.; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681–83 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 243. See supra Part I.C.2 (explaining merger, scènes à faire, and functionality doctrines). 
 244. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 557–59 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining and citing cases on both 
sides of this split); Ocasio, supra note 150, at 310–23 (reviewing circuit split). 
 245. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle District Court), 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1000–01 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 246. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361–62, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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of originality, both because the TLP’s structure was dictated by 
functionality and because Lexmark used it as a “lock-out code” for their 
printers.
247
 In effect, the opinion treats merger as part of the 
copyrightability/originality analysis, but it still applies idea-expression at 
the time of infringement because it considers the TLP’s subsequent use as 
a lock-out code. On the other side, the Federal Circuit in Oracle purports 
to apply merger as part of the infringement analysis, but nonetheless 
applies the idea-expression distinction at the time of creation, focusing 
only on the choices available to Oracle.
248
 The chart below summarizes the 
approaches taken in the cases discussed in Part II.A. 
TABLE 1: DIFFERING JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE TIMING PROBLEM 
 
When the Idea-Expression Distinction Is Applied 
Stage at Which 
Merger and 
Scènes à Faire 
Are Assessed 
 Time of Creation Time of Infringement 
Copyrightability 
Lexmark (E.D. Ky.) 
Result: Plaintiff wins 
Lexmark (Sutton); 
Oracle (N.D. Cal) 
Result: Plaintiff loses, 
invalid copyright 
Infringement 
Oracle (Fed. Cir.) 
Result: Plaintiff wins 
Lexmark (Feikens) 
Result: Plaintiff loses, 
no infringement 
 
Though much of the literature and case law focuses on the first issue, 
the second split is the critical one. The copyrightability versus 
infringement question, as a practical matter, only affects remedy—whether 
the plaintiff loses his copyright entirely (no copyrightability), or merely 
loses the particular dispute (no infringement). It is the timing issue that 
determines whether the plaintiff wins or loses. When courts look only to 
the time of creation, they tend to conclude that the plaintiff’s work 
involved creative choice that was not dictated entirely by functional 
concerns, and thus find liability. If courts instead look to the choices 
available to the infringer, they usually conclude that the allegedly 
 
 
 247. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 539–41. 
 248. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1358. 
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infringing expression became (or “merged” with) a functional idea, and 
find no liability. So long as a court applies the idea-expression 
dynamically, the scope of the plaintiff’s loss (no copyright versus no 
infringement) is of less import. In the usual case, a finding of no 
infringement will effectively make the copyright unenforceable, even if 
the ruling was formally limited to infringement. The critical feature of 
these disputes is whether “idea” is defined flexibly, to recognize that 
subsequent developments and context can transform seeming expression 
into an unprotectable idea, procedure, or method of operation. 
Lexmark provides the clearest example.
249
 Stripped of context, the TLP 
may contain some protectable expression (if not a lot)—it is just a simple 
program that checks a toner level that, we will assume arguendo, could 
have been written in multiple ways. At the time of creation, it may have 
contained copyrightable expression. But it is abundantly clear that, as 
Lexmark used it and as SCC copied it, the TLP cannot be protected. To do 
so would be to ignore the context that transformed the TLP into a lock-out 
code—a method of operation that it was necessary to copy in order to 
make use of the printer. As Judge Feikens’ example made clear, it would 
not matter whether the TLP was undoubtedly expressive material (even a 
poem) out of context. What matters is that the defendant was only copying 
it for the functional purpose of operating the printer. Thus, as used, the 
TLP cannot be protectable even if it were copyrightable at the time of 
creation. 
It is difficult to defend decisions like the Federal Circuit’s in Oracle 
that take a contrary approach. There is simply no good legal or policy 
reason to employ an artificially constrained definition of “idea.” Looking 
only at the time of creation ignores subsequent events and context that are 
often the heart of why the alleged infringer copied. The highly formalistic 
approach of the Federal Circuit in Oracle denies the practical reality of the 
constraints faced by Google due to context and circumstances. It is also 
inconsistent with the copyright statute, which states that “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery . . . .”250 It is hard to imagine language that is more absolute and 
unqualified. Copyright simply cannot be applied to ideas, methods of 
operation, and the like—regardless of when they become such.  
 
 
 249. See supra notes 131–49 and accompanying text. 
 250. 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2014) (emphasis added). 
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More fundamentally, the Federal Circuit’s approach in Oracle 
threatens the public’s right to the free flow of ideas, the balance at the core 
of copyright.
251
 It goes against the core constitutional purpose of 
“promot[ing] . . . Progress”252 for copyright to lock up something as 
general as an idea, regardless of when it attained that status. Copyright’s 
extraordinary term of the author’s life plus seventy years makes it 
particularly absurd to ignore changed circumstances and dynamic 
effects.
253
 This is an especially acute problem in the context of software, 
where material can quickly become a widely adopted industry standard.
254
 
The policy case for a dynamic idea-expression distinction is really quite 
overwhelming.
255
 In the most generous view, it may be that courts’ view 
of the first issue, whether merger is part of copyrightability or part of 
infringement analysis—which is debatable—is clouding their view of the 
second, more fundamental timing concern. 
That leaves the issue of remedy: if idea and expression merge 
subsequent to creation, should we deny copyrightability altogether, or 
simply find no infringement? Contrary to the views of some 
commentators, a holding that the copyright is entirely invalid may go too 
far.
256
 Judge Feikens’ example of a poem used as a lock-out code 
illustrates that a work may be an unprotectable idea in one context, but 
protectable expression in another. Thus, viewing merger as part of 
infringement, but evaluating the idea-expression distinction at the time of 
infringement, offers a reasonable middle ground. The alternative 
approach—taken by Judge Sutton in Lexmark, for example—is oddly 
 
 
 251. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (citing Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985)) (“[C]opyright assures authors 
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”). 
 252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 253. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2014) (setting general copyright term as the life of the author plus 
seventy years). 
 254. See generally sources cited supra note 151. 
 255. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 111, at 1066–68, 1099–1101 (arguing that network effects urge 
application of merger doctrine to prevent protection of a “de facto industry standard”); Samuelson, 
supra note 111, at 196–215, 221–24 (arguing that coding standards should be uncopyrightable under 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) due to competition and public policy concerns); Fred Anthony Rowley, Jr., Note, 
Dynamic Copyright Law: Its Problems and a Possible Solution, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 495–96 
(1998) (arguing that copying of standard user interface elements should be permitted to avoid locking 
out subsequent innovators); Teter, supra note 111, at 1066–72 (arguing that copying to permit 
compatibility must be permitted as a matter of policy). 
 256. See, e.g., Ocasio, supra note 150, at 310–23 (arguing that merger should be applied as part of 
the copyrightability analysis); Preonas, supra note 111, at 97–109 (arguing that, in the context of 
factual compilations, “mergercide” should invalidate copyright when once-original expression 
becomes an idea). 
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achronological, as it applies merger as formally part of copyrightability 
but still looks ahead to time of infringement. This gets the important issues 
right, but it is more conceptually coherent to apply merger at the time of 
infringement and as part of the infringement analysis. This also avoids the 
perceived harshness of a complete forfeiture of copyright, while still 
permitting copying for purposes of functionality or compatibility. In 
effect, such a view adopts the perspective of both the original creator and 
alleged infringer. It looks to the choices available to the original author at 
the time of creation as part of the originality analysis, but also considers 
the options available to the alleged infringer at the time of infringement, 
when considering substantial similarity. 
B. A Qualitative, Contextual Approach to Substantiality and 
Dissimilarities 
This Part argues against using either only the plaintiff’s work or the 
defendant’s work as the baseline for assessing substantiality. The 
quantitative, percentage-style baselines invoked in cases such as Harper & 
Row and Newton v. Diamond needlessly ignore important context—either 
the nature of the use, or the nature of the original work.
257
 Indeed, outside 
of the context of linear, literary works, the concept of quantitative measure 
becomes incoherent.  
For similar reasons, courts should not ignore important dissimilarities 
between the original and accused works by focusing solely on the 
plaintiff’s work. The tendency of some courts to disregard important 
dissimilarities results from a misunderstanding of the Sheldon rule and its 
misapplication far beyond its original purpose. Instead, courts should take 
a primarily qualitative approach to substantiality, considering relative 
importance contextually, using both works as baselines and not dismissing 
dissimilarities as irrelevant to the infringement analysis. 
The current approach to the baseline and dissimilarity problems—to 
the extent there is any consensus at all—is embodied in the Sheldon rule. 
Recall that Sheldon instructs courts to ignore the changes that an alleged 
infringer has made because “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by 
showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”258 Sheldon leads courts 
to take the plaintiff’s work as the baseline for comparison, which has the 
effect of making the original work the more prominent, and biases the 
 
 
 257. See supra Part II.B (reviewing case law examples of the baseline problem). 
 258. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
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comparison in favor of the plaintiff.
259
 (This concern is exacerbated when 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work is well known, a not uncommon scenario 
in copyright disputes.
260
) Many courts invoke Sheldon to justify using the 
plaintiff’s work as the baseline when measuring the quantitative 
significance of the defendant’s copying.261 Some courts have extended the 
Sheldon rule to disregard dissimilarities between the two works and 
changes that the defendant has made.
262
 
The Sheldon rule is triply wrong. First, the “tacking on” concern that 
motivated Sheldon is overstated, and courts have not been careful to limit 
the Sheldon rule to its original context of linear, literary works. Second, a 
strict application of Sheldon causes courts to ignore the context of the 
defendant’s use, context that may be critical to understanding whether the 
alleged infringement should be actionable. Sheldon is thus unfair to 
defendants when it ignores the new material that they added and the 
context in which the alleged infringement was made. Finally, Sheldon is 
incorrect to focus myopically on the plaintiff’s work as the baseline. This 
can result in unfairness to the plaintiff, such as in the Antonick case, when 
larger works are effectively penalized for involving additional expression. 
Courts’ tendency to shift baselines in an ad hoc fashion may well be an 
indication of the tensions created by a strict application of Sheldon. 
The concern that motivated Sheldon is the “tacking on” problem—the 
idea that an infringer could escape liability simply by adding a mass of 
new, extraneous material to his infringing work.
263
 This concern is 
overstated. It is not apparent in the facts of Sheldon itself, and it is far from 
clear that the tacking-on problem is a realistic scenario. In any event, even 
presuming the concern is real, there are better and more direct ways to deal 
with the problem of “manipulating” the de minimis inquiry.264 Blatant 
attempts to avoid infringement by tacking on additional material can be 
easily ferreted out directly by courts, and dismissed via equitable 
doctrines.
265
 
 
 
 259. See supra notes 13, 108–09 and accompanying text (summarizing results from cognitive 
science that greater similarity is perceived when the more prominent of two concepts is treated as the 
baseline). 
 260. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (finding infringement of Harry Potter series of novels); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol 
Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding infringement of Seinfeld television series). 
 261. See supra notes 164–75 and accompanying text (discussing Newton v. Diamond). 
 262. See supra notes 209–24 and accompanying text (discussing Tufenkian). 
 263. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 264. Cf. 3 PATRY, supra note 5, § 9:65 (“[Sheldon] has rightly been cited as authority against 
attempts to manipulate the de minimis [infringement] inquiry.”). 
 265. See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1977 (2014) (indicating 
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In the more usual case, what was added by the defendant is not “tacked 
on,” but rather important, and should not be ignored. The addition of new 
expression by the defendant is typically not extraneous, unrelated 
material—as envisioned by Sheldon—but instead precisely the type of 
expression one might want to encourage through copyright. Take Newton 
v. Diamond as an example.
266
 Though one could view the rapping and 
music that the Beastie Boys added as “tacked on,” that is a ridiculous 
claim—the material added is the heart of how the Beastie Boys used the 
sample to make a new work. Notably, the Sheldon rule is precisely the 
opposite of what courts do in the context of fair use, where much of the 
emphasis is rightly on whether the defendant transformed the original 
work and added “something new.”267 In the context of similarity, the 
defendant’s new material is relevant both to the perceived similarity of a 
lay observer, as well as to any economic harm caused by the 
infringement.
268
  
It is therefore odd to dismiss the defendant’s new material or 
dissimilarities between the two works out of hand. Why would we not 
consider the defendant’s actual use in the context of his new work? In 
Newton, the Beastie Boys should certainly prevail, but not because their 
looping is “irrelevant.”269 Of course it’s relevant. If “Pass the Mic” were 
nothing but Newton’s flute sample looped for three minutes—no rapping, 
no added samples and instrumental music—would it not be a different, 
and tougher, case? Moreover, although ignoring the defendant’s use in 
Newton worked to the advantage of the defendant, usually it is used in the 
opposite manner, as it was in Sheldon itself. This is true in the Tufenkian 
case, for example, where Sheldon was invoked to prevent the defendant 
from relying on dissimilarities to negate the infringement claim.
270
 In other 
words, although Sheldon saves the Beastie Boys from having to explain 
looping, it leaves them unable to rely on the fact that they added new 
samples, rapping, and live instruments over the Newton sample. Similarly, 
 
 
that equitable doctrine of estoppel is available in copyright actions); Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 
680 (8th Cir. 1992) (confirming that the doctrine of unclean hands is applicable in copyright actions). 
 266. See supra notes 164–75 and accompanying text (discussing Newton). 
 267. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 268. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property 
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014) (arguing that infringement in intellectual property 
regimes should only be found when works are similar from a technical perspective, and cause market 
harm from the view of consumers); Lape, supra note 10, at 202 (arguing that substantial similarity 
requires a finding of “economic harm” or other “injury that may have an impact on authors’ incentive 
to create”). 
 269. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 270. See supra notes 209–24 and accompanying text (discussing Tufenkian). 
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it leaves the defendants in cases like Tufenkian or Adler unable to rely 
upon the important dissimilarities between their works and the original 
works. Considering only what the defendant copied, without considering 
how the defendant used what was copied in context, or the changes she 
made, is a form of willful blindness that tends to bias the inquiry against 
defendants. 
The Sheldon rule can sometimes be unfair to plaintiffs as well. In 
particular, using the plaintiff’s work as the measure for quantitative 
substantiality effectively penalizes the plaintiff for creating more 
expression. Consider the facts of the Antonick case, for example.
271
 There, 
no substantial similarity was found because the original work was 
complex—a football simulation video game—even though EA had copied 
Antonick’s code for plays and formations. When the original work 
happens to be large—be it Ford’s ponderous memoir in Harper & Row, or 
the millions of lines of code in Antonick or Oracle—percentage-style 
measures using the plaintiff’s work as the baseline dilute the significance 
of what was taken. In Harper & Row, three hundred words is a trivial 
percentage of Ford’s memoir, but it might still be substantial in context. 
As Table 2 shows, percentage-based measures can vary widely depending 
on the baseline. 
TABLE 2: QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF HOW MUCH WAS COPIED USING 
VARIOUS BASELINES 
Baseline Harper & Row Newton v. Diamond Oracle v. 
Google 
Antonick v. 
Electronic 
Arts 
Plaintiff’s 
work 
0.1% 
(“insubstantial”) 
2% of running time; 
greater % of score 
3% of copied 
APIs; trivial 
% of Java 
small 
Defendant’s 
work 
“at least 13%” looped background 
element; significant 
(1/5) part of song 
trivial % of 
Android 
small 
Absolute 
taking 
300 words, plus 
paraphrasing 
six seconds; three 
note phrase 
7,000 lines of 
code 
code for 
plays and 
formations 
 
 
 271. See supra notes 182–92 and accompanying text (discussing the Antonick case). 
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Using the plaintiff’s work as the baseline thus seems perverse if 
copyright is designed to incent new expression. Taken literally, it 
effectively penalizes original creators for creating more expression. The 
real issue in these cases is whether what was taken was substantial in 
itself, and qualitatively significant in the context of both the original and 
accused works. The court in Antonick should consider whether the plays 
and formation code is significant in overall qualitative importance to the 
games, how many lines of code total were copied, and how much of that 
was commonplace or dictated by functionality. To dismiss the plays and 
formation code as insignificant only because it is small piece of a larger 
game misses the point. In this respect, Justice O’Connor’s focus on the 
qualitative import of the expression in Harper & Row was correct. 
However, the sleight of hand involved in invoking the defendant’s work as 
the baseline in Harper & Row—“at least 13% of the infringing article”—is 
misleading.
272
 These percentage-style measures are red herrings. Would 
Harper & Row really be a different case if Ford’s memoir were only 
10,000 words, or if The Nation’s article were twice as long? Does it really 
matter in Oracle how many millions of lines of code are in Java or 
Android? Probably not, and courts should not imply otherwise.  
Furthermore, the notion of a percentage measure is unsound for non-
linear works. In literary works, we can at least count the number of words 
or lines of code taken—though, of course, paraphrasing may present some 
difficulties. For musical works, one instinct is to look to the percentage of 
the running time, as the Newton court did. But it is not clear why that 
measure is superior to using the number of notes, the percentage of the 
score, or the prominence of a sound in the mix. Running time also 
becomes deceptive when there is more than one sample or instrument 
playing simultaneously, as is usual. In theory, one could try to apportion 
this—say, 25% of two minutes for the first sample, etc.—but this quickly 
becomes arbitrary. More importantly, such quantitative measures only 
avoid the real issues of qualitative significance. In Newton, the courts 
should be asking whether the idea of singing into a flute is even 
protectable expression at all, not whether “six seconds” or “three notes” is 
a significant part of Newton’s composition. If Newton had squeezed a 
Charlie Parker-style flurry of notes into the six-second sample, or if 
“Choir” was only twenty seconds long, the measures the majority relied 
upon in Newton would greatly change. However, the fundamentals of the 
case would not be truly different. 
 
 
 272. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985). 
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The difficulties of quantitative measurement are even more serious for 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.
273
 For visual works intended to be 
perceived as an entirety, one can scarcely begin to imagine how to define a 
percentage appropriation. Take the two bubble-blowing Santa ornaments 
in Adler as an example.
274
 How does one calculate what “percentage” of 
the ornaments are the same, and how much of that was due to protectable 
elements? We are at a loss to say. In theory, perhaps, one could analyze a 
two-dimensional work pixel-by-pixel and count the pixels that are 
identical. But this method is coherent, and then just barely, only in the 
special case of pastiche.
275
 A pixel-by-pixel analysis would likely yield 
zero or a trivial number of similarities in a case where an artist’s visual 
style was copied—Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries is a well-
known example—even though it is clear to a lay observer that something 
was taken (whether we think that something is protectable or not).
276
 This 
pixel-based measure also runs aground without a way to exclude all 
unprotected material. The rugs in Tufenkian, for example, might be highly 
similar on pixel percentage basis, but that is likely only because they are 
both derived from the same public domain sources. 
In sum, courts should focus mainly on the contextual, qualitative 
importance of what was copied in assessing its significance in substantial 
similarity. If the Sheldon rule must be invoked at all, it should be limited 
to its original purpose—cases where a plaintiff or defendant attempts to 
manipulate the infringement inquiry by adding extraneous material. To the 
extent courts must consider the copying quantitatively at all, the best 
course may be to measure the expression copied as an absolute matter. 
Such a measure looks to the total number of words copied, the number of 
lines of code, or the length of a piece of music, but always in light of the 
qualitative significance of that expression in context, including its level of 
originality and its economic significance.
277
 The absolute measure at least 
gets courts thinking about the right questions—for example, whether what 
was copied was too short, too commonplace, or too functional to be 
 
 
 273. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2014). 
 274. See supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text (discussing Adler). 
 275. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–12 (2d Cir. 2013) (assessing whether series of 
appropriation art pastiche of photographs from earlier works was a fair use). 
 276. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). That case involved a poster for the movie “Moscow on 
the Hudson” that evoked the style of Saul Steinberg, an artist for the New Yorker, and in particular his 
famous work “View of the World from 9th Avenue.” Id. at 708–11. 
 277. Cf. Busek, supra note 10, at 1795–1803 (arguing for an approach to substantial similarity 
based on the degree of possible expressive variation); Lape, supra note 10, at 194–206 (arguing for an 
approach to substantial similarity based on substantial economic or other harm to the plaintiff). 
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protectable expression—and not its relative shortness vis-à-vis the 
plaintiff’s or defendant’s work.278 Similarly, courts should not disregard 
material added by the defendant, or important dissimilarities that 
undermine perceived similarity. Ignoring dissimilarities is another 
unintended result of Sheldon’s dictum. It is a mistake to adhere to this rule 
literally, as the Second Circuit did in Tufenkian. The balance struck by 
Judge Newman in Warner Bros. is a sounder approach. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to bring attention to the framing problems that 
plague courts’ analyses of similarity in copyright infringement. Courts 
take a distressingly inconsistent approach to the issues of baselines, 
timing, perspective, and dissimilarities when structuring the comparison 
between the original and the accused works. The result is widespread 
confusion, unpredictability, and contradictory results. This Article argues 
that courts should take a flexible, contextual approach to similarity’s 
framing problems. Such an approach is fairer to both parties, more 
predictable, and truer to copyright’s purpose of promoting the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge. It avoids the manipulation and biases created 
by the more rigid approaches that predominate in the case law. Most 
importantly, it serves to guarantee substantial similarity’s role as a robust 
and vital limitation on the scope of copyright. 
 
 
 278. This is one of the few things that the Federal Circuit got right in Oracle. The fact that “7,000 
lines of code” were copied is probably more relevant than the fact that those lines are only a trivial 
aspect of Java or Android. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
However, the qualitative significance of the code in that case makes it obvious that no infringement 
should be found. The key issue in that case was not the total amount taken, but its standard, 
commonplace, and functional nature. Arguably, Google might be permitted to copy the whole of the 
APIs. 
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